Executive Power and the Law of Nations in the Washington Administration by Reinstein, Robert J.
University of Richmond Law Review
Volume 46 | Issue 2 Article 2
1-1-2012
Executive Power and the Law of Nations in the
Washington Administration
Robert J. Reinstein
Temple University Beasley School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview
Part of the Legal History Commons, and the President/Executive Department Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Richmond Law Review by an authorized editor of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert J. Reinstein, Executive Power and the Law of Nations in the Washington Administration, 46 U. Rich. L. Rev. 373 (2012).
Available at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol46/iss2/2
EXECUTIVE POWER AND THE LAW OF NATIONS IN
THE WASHINGTON ADMINISTRATION
Robert J. Reinstein *
In this issue's lead article, Professor Reinstein continues
his examination of the development of executive power over
foreign affairs during the early history of the Republic. Re-
cently, both legal scholars and the courts are looking to the
actions of the first administration as a potential precedent on
how to construe the scope and source of the President's au-
thority to determine and conduct the United States' foreign
policy. Last year, in an article published in this journal, Pro-
fessor Reinstein concluded that no originalist justification ex-
ists for a plenary executive recognition power. In this article,
Professor Reinstein expands this discussion through an orig-
inal historical and jurisprudential account of the Neutrality
Crisis of 1792-1794 to draw three revisionist conclusions.
First, he concludes that the Washington administration's
most plausible source of constitutional authority was the Ex-
ecutive's duty, under the Take Care Clause, to obey the law of
nations as expounded in the natural law treatises. Second,
the Washington administration set a key precedent for the
Executive's duty to obey the constraints of international law.
And third, since profound changes in the United States have
shown that the founders' way of thinking can be incompatible
with our own, Professor Reinstein concludes that originalism
is limited as a constitutional methodology and that theories
of expansive executive powers must find foundations outside
of the first President's decisions.
* Clifford Scott Green Professor of Law, Temple University Beasley School of Law.
J.D., 1968, Harvard University School of Law; B.S., 1965, Cornell University.
My grateful appreciation to Jane Baron, William (Chip) Carter, Jeffrey Dunoff, Craig
Green, Duncan Hollis, H. Jefferson Powell, and David Waldstreicher for reviewing drafts
and making very helpful criticisms and suggestions; and to Erin Grewe and Eleanor Pea-
cock for extraordinary research assistance. I also benefited from the criticisms and insights
of David Golove, Daniel J. Hulsebosch, and other participants at a colloquium on the paper
held at New York University School of Law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Washington administration has attracted increased atten-
tion in the ongoing debate over the power of the President to de-
termine and conduct the nation's foreign policy.! The actions of the
first President are being seen as important precedents on the
scope of executive power, much as the statutes of the first Con-
gress are recognized as being important precedents on the scope of
legislative power.
This article provides revisionist answers to three key questions
concerning the Washington administration's assumption of au-
thority in foreign policy: What constitutional source of power did
the administration actually rely upon? How did its jurisprudential
understanding of the law of nations affect the exercise of executive
power? And does the experience of the Washington administration
demonstrate the limits of originalism as a constitutional method-
ology?
Washington's most important and dramatic exercise of control
over the nation's foreign policy-and the one that has attracted
the most scholarly attention-occurred during the Neutrality Cri-
sis of 1792-1794, when the United States was threatened with
being engulfed into the European wars. Washington's decisions
during that crisis were remarkable as unilateral exercises of ex-
ecutive power. Without statutory authority or obvious support
from the Constitution's text, Washington did the following: (1)
recognized the new French revolutionary government, (2) received
its controversial foreign minister and requested his recall, (3) is-
sued a Neutrality Proclamation (also the "Proclamation") declar-
ing that the United States was "impartial" in France's war
against Great Britain and its allies, (4) announced and imple-
mented a policy of strict neutrality towards the belligerents, (5)
1. See, e.g., WILLIAM R. CASTO, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE AGE
OF FIGHTING SAIL 61-66, 164-91 (2006) [hereinafter CASTO, FOREIGN AFFAIRS]; H. JEFFER-
SON POWELL, THE PRESIDENT'S AUTHORITY OVER FOREIGN AFFAIRS 37-61, 118-19 (2002);
MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION'S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 76-88 (2007); JOHN
Yoo, CRISIS AND COMMAND 53-97 (2009); Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Execu-
tive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545, 636-88 (2004); David
M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early American Constitution,
the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932,
1019-39 (2010); Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over
Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 295-355 (2001); John Yoo, George Washington and the
Executive Power, 5 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1 (2010).
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determined that the revolutionary-era treaties with France were
still in effect, (6) interpreted those treaties to comply with strict
neutrality, (7) issued Rules on Neutrality that declared specific
conduct by the belligerents within the United States to be lawful
or unlawful, and (8) initiated nonstatutory prosecutions against
American citizens for committing acts of hostility against a bellig-
erent.
A number of theories have been advanced to justify Washing-
ton's actions, ranging from the expansive theory that the Article II
Vesting Clause provides the President with residual plenary pow-
ers over foreign affairs2 to more modest theories that retrospec-
tively ascribe or stretch individual textual clauses in the Constitu-
tion.' This paper presents a different historical and jurispruden-
tial account of the most plausible actual source of the administra-
tion's power. As a devoted believer in the rule of law, George
Washington acted decisively, but only after he was convinced that
there was firm constitutional support for his actions. The Presi-
dent's duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed, and
the consensus during the founding era that the law of nations was
part of the law of the land, provided that support. In other words,
rather than exercising discretionary power, Washington acted on
the authority of the Take Care Clause, and the specific law he
sought to execute was the law of nations.
2. RAMSEY, supra note 1, at 76-88; Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 1, at 295-355.
Other scholars rely on the Washington administration to present variations of this argu-
ment-that the Vesting Clause gives the President an initiating but concurrent power over
foreign affairs with Congress, see CASTO, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 1, at 61-66, or that
post-ratification constitutionalists applied a pragmatic approach to foreign policy that rec-
ognizes the institutional superiority of the executive branch, see POWELL, supra note 1, at
37-61, 118-19.
3. Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 1, at 636-88 (asserting that individual actions of
the administration could each be explained hypothetically by applying or stretching vari-
ous textual sources). Scholars who advocate greater constitutional authority for Congress
in foreign affairs (particularly in the use of military force) tend either to focus on selected
actions of the Washington administration or to ignore them altogether by relying on the
constitutional text as elaborated in the drafting and ratification debates. E.g., David Gray
Adler, The President's Recognition Power, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 133, 137-38 (David Gray Adler & Larry George eds. 1996);
LOUIs FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 249-
86 (5th rev. ed. 2007); LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 1-16 (2d ed., rev. 2004);
HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 67-100 (1990); Arthur
Bestor, Respective Roles of Senate and President in the Making and Abrogation of Trea-
ties-The Original Intent of the Framers and the Constitution Historically Examined, 55
WASH. L. REV. 1, 30-46 (1979); Arthur Bestor, Separation of Powers in the Domain of For-
eign Affairs: The Intent of the Constitution Historically Examined, 5 SETON HALL L. REV.
527, 660-65 (1974).
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The declarations of the Washington administration invariably
relied on its duty to execute the law of nations. Nevertheless, for
over one-hundred years, historians and legal scholars have uni-
formly rejected the administration's explanations for its exercise
of executive power. Inasmuch as no uniform practice among Eu-
ropean countries was present that would have required the strict
neutrality decisions made by the Washington administration,
commentators have concluded that those decisions were discre-
tionary executive choices. This paper demonstrates that these ac-
ademics mistakenly projected their own method of thinking about
law onto the founding generation by assuming that legal positiv-
ism was the correct method for determining the content of inter-
national law in the eighteenth century. That method is not how
the administration thought about the law of nations. Those in the
founding generation who were educated in the law were natural
lawyers, and they regarded as authoritative the continental publi-
cists who shared their jurisprudence of natural law and their fun-
damental values. Washington was in fact an extremely cautious
constitutionalist, and his compliance with the law of nations as
expounded by the continental publicists figured much more heavi-
ly in his decisions than abstract theories of executive power.
Moreover, the duty to comply with the law of nations as expound-
ed by the continental publicists appears to be the only theory that
explains and justifies the administration's actions (and refusals to
take action) during the Neutrality Crisis.
This thesis has other implications regarding executive power
and international law. Washington's actions were based on the
principle that the Executive has the duty and the resulting power
to comply with the obligations of the law of nations. To the extent
that international law remains part of national law, the actions of
the Washington administration appear to provide an important
precedent for the duty of the Executive to obey the constraints of
international law.
But to what extent can Washington's actions during the Neu-
trality Crisis be used as precedents for the scope of executive pow-
er over foreign affairs beyond the duty to comply with interna-
tional law? The foreign policy decisions of the Washington admin-
istration are important, but its actions cannot be considered as
artificially distinct precedents for modern general constitutional
theories of executive power. Evaluating the administration's deci-
sions requires an understanding of the reasons for its actions, and
2012]1 377
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particularly its reasons for believing that those actions were con-
stitutionally legitimate. Those reasons were founded on a natural
law jurisprudence of the law of nations that was a product of its
time. One of the profound changes that has occurred in the United
States is that the founders' way of thinking about law can be in-
compatible with our own. Such is the case for the Washington
administration, and it places an intrinsic limit on the use of
originalism in developing or supporting any modern general theo-
ry of executive power. This result does not ultimately confirm or
reject any such theories. It does mean, however, that all such the-
ories must rest on a foundation other than the actions of our first
President.
This article is organized as follows. Part I presents an overview
of the thesis that Washington's actions were based on the duties of
neutrality imposed by the law of nations and the longstanding
criticism of that thesis by historians and legal scholars. The ful-
crum of that criticism is that Washington's decision to adopt strict
neutrality, as opposed to a benevolent neutrality favoring France,
was not required by international law, but was a discretionary
choice of policy. Responding to this criticism, Part II begins by ex-
amining these differences in European neutrality practices and
the significance of the administration's choice of strict neutrality.
This part then shows that the critics erred in missing important
precedents of strict neutrality that were well known to the admin-
istration, in projecting onto the founding generation their own
theory that legal positivism is the basis of international law, and
in not understanding why the continental publicists, rather than
European practice, were the administration's principal authorities
on the law of nations.
To those of us educated on Anglo-American principles of law, it
may be counterintuitive that the founding generation would rely
on philosophers from non-common law nations as the authorities
of the law of nations. Part III reviews the enormous influence of
the continental publicists-and the reasons for that influence-in
their jurisprudential principles, legal doctrines, and moral values.
A particular focus is on the treatise of Emmerich de Vattel, which
served as the administration's principal source for determining
the content of the law of nations.
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But did the administration really consider the law of nations in
determining the nation's foreign policies? That issue is explored in
Part IV, which examines the internal Cabinet debate on the valid-
ity of the French treaties (that wound up turning largely on the
meaning of a single passage in Vattel's treatise), the request for a
legal opinion from the Supreme Court, and the development of
executive Rules of Neutrality.
As a related matter, Part V examines the extent to which the
administration really followed the law of nations as expounded by
the continental publicists during the Neutrality Crisis. This part
illuminates the intersection of executive power and the law of na-
tions in decisive actions of the administration (recognizing the
revolutionary French governments, receiving and requesting the
recall of Genet, issuing the Neutrality Proclamation, and prose-
cuting American citizens for acts of hostility against a belligerent)
as well as in its refusals to take certain actions (prohibiting the
French sales of prizes and demanding that "free ships make free
goods"). Part VI analyses whether an alternative theory of execu-
tive power, which was originally advanced separately by Thomas
Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton while members of the Wash-
ington administration, explains and justifies the administration's
decisions.
Finally, the conclusion discusses how this study of history and
jurisprudence relates to the three questions examined in this pa-
per: the constitutional source of authority used by the Washington
administration, the duty of the Executive to comply with the con-
straints of international law, and the limits of originalism as a
constitutional methodology.
II. THE LAW OF NATIONS THESIS
The thesis of this paper is that the source of executive power
upon which Washington relied-and the only one that appears to
explain and justify all of his decisions during the Neutrality Cri-
sis-is the President's duty to execute the law of nations as incor-
porated into the laws of the United States.
Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution imposes a duty on the
President to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."' If
4. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
2012] 379
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
the term "laws" refers only to positive laws, this thesis could not
be correct.' No federal statute authorized any of the Executive's
unilateral decisions during the Neutrality Crisis, which arose
when Congress was not in session; and Washington declined to
call Congress into session in order to obtain statutory authority.
However, a strong consensus existed in the founding era (and no
recorded dissent) that the law of nations was part of the law of the
land.! During the entire Neutrality Crisis, the Washington admin-
istration repeatedly told the French and British governments that
its decisions were required by, and consistent with, the duties of
strict neutrality imposed on the United States by the law of na-
tions, and the administration gave as its authorities the line of
continental publicists' from Grotius through Vattel9 whose trea-
tises expounded the law of nations.'o
5. The term "laws," as used in the Constitution, is surprisingly ambiguous. Consider,
for example, the Supremacy Clause:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution
or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
The first use of "Laws" in the Supremacy Clause certainly refers to congressional stat-
utes, but why not to federal court judge-made law as well? The third reference to "Laws"
necessarily includes the judge-made common laws of the states. If it did not, then the state
judges could hold that the common law was superior to the Constitution. And if the first
use of "Laws" meant only statutes, and that definition were applied to the Take Care
Clause, the President would not be obligated to enforce the Constitution and treaties, a
reading that would make that clause impotent and the Supremacy Clause self-
contradictory (because the second reference to "Law" in the Supremacy Clause specifically
includes the Constitution and treaties). It is beyond the scope of this paper to attempt to
reconcile these ambiguities. I point them out to illustrate the possible indeterminacy of
that term when used in the Take Care Clause.
6. See CASTO, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 1, at 29-30; CHARLES MARION THOMAS,
AMERICAN NEUTRALITY IN 1793, at 66-68 (1967).
7. See Edwin D. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the
United States-Part I, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 26 (1953); MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTION-
AL DIPLOMACY 251-58 (1990); RAMSEY, supra note 1, at 342-61; Stewart Jay, The Status of
the Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42 VAND. L. REV. 819, 839-42 (1989); Jordan J.
Paust, In Their Own Words: Affirmations of the Founders, Framers, and Early Judiciary
Concerning the Binding Nature of the Customary Law of Nations, 14 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L.
& POL'Y 205, 231-40 (2008); Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Customary Internation-
al Law as Federal Law After Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 393, 401-08 (1997).
8. They are referred to as publicists because their treatises purported to state what
the law is, as deduced from principles of natural law. See Edwin D. Dickinson, Changing
Concepts and the Doctrine of Incorporation, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 239, 259 (1932) [hereinafter
Dickinson, Changing Concepts].
9. See infra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
10. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to British Minister George Hammond (May 15,
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If, as this paper concludes, Washington's power to insure strict
neutrality derived from a duty to comply with the obligations of
the law of nations, and if his decisions were consistent with those
obligations, then his actions during the Neutrality Crisis would be
1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 38, 38-40 (John Catanzariti et al. eds.,
1995) (stating that the fitting of French privateers in U.S. ports to prey on British ship-
ping, recruiting Americans to perform military service against Britain, establishing admi-
ralty courts operated by French consuls, and seizing the British ship Grange in neutral
territory violate the law of nations, but that the private trade in contraband does not); Let-
ter from Thomas Jefferson to French Minister Jean Baptiste Ternant (May 15, 1793), in 26
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, at 42, 42-44 (same); Letter from Thomas Jef-
ferson to French Minister Edmond Charles Genet (June 17, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, at 297, 298-99 (protesting and declaring unlawful, based on
Vattel and Wolff, Genet's actions in arming a vessel in port of New York for the purpose of
committing hostilities against a nation with which the United States is at peace); Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond Charles Genet (July 16, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, at 510, 510-12 (relying on Grotius, Puffendorf, Bynkershoeck,
Wolff, and Vattel, warning Genet that the establishment of admiralty courts in the United
States by French consuls is not required by treaty and violates the law of nations); Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond Charles Genet (July 24, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, at 557, 557-58 (stating that the principle of "free ships makes
free goods" is not recognized by the law of nations); Id. at 557-59 (invoking the law of na-
tions to answer Genet's question concerning the seizure of an American vessel on the high
seas by Great Britain); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond Charles Genet (Aug. 7,
1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, at 633, 633-64 (defending Wash-
ington's decision to give restoration or restitution to Great Britain for illegally seized ves-
sels because the President considered himself bound "to positive assurances, given in con-
formity to the laws of neutrality'); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to U.S. Minister to France
Gouverneur Morris (Aug. 16, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, at
697, 699 (requesting recall of Genet and accusing him of violating American neutrality
according to law of nations as expounded by "the most enlightened and approved writers on
the subject"); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Hammond (Sept. 5, 1793), in 27 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 35, 36-37 (1997) (stating that the United States will pro-
vide restitution for British ships seized in violation of the law of nations); Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to George Hammond and Netherlands Minister F. P. Van Berckel (Sept.
9, 1793), in 27 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, at 70, 70-71 (stating that, under
the treaties and law of nations, British and Dutch privateers could not enter U.S. ports but
that the public armed vessels of Britain and the Netherlands will have an exact equality of
access as provided to France); Circular to French Consuls and Vice-Consuls (Sept. 7, 1793),
in 27 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, at 51, 51 (declaring that the establish-
ment of foreign admiralty courts in the United States and enlistment of American citizens
to commit acts of hostilities against a country with which the United States was at peace
are illegal, and threatening to revoke the exequatur and prosecute any consul who commits
either act); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond Charles Genet (Nov. 30, 1793), in 27
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, at 458, 458-59 (stating that, pursuant to the
law of nations, the United States will not protect any of its citizens who engage in the con-
traband trade); Letter from Secretary of State Edmund Randolph to George Hammond
(June 2, 1794), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS 464, 465 (Walter Lowrie eds., 1833) (explain-
ing that the administration did not prohibit the direct sale of prizes by French-
commissioned privateers because there was insufficient authority in the treatises of the
continental publicists).
For the sake of brevity, subsequent citations to volumes of The Papers of Thomas Jeffer-
son edited by John Catanzariti et al. omit editor and publication information. The lone
exception is volume sixteen edited by Julian P. Boyd et al. See note 373.
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authorized by the Take Care Clause. This conclusion would pro-
vide a straightforward explanation for Washington's constitution-
al authority and would also shed new light on the early under-
standings of both executive power and the incorporation of inter-
national law into the law of the United States.
This thesis has been rejected by legal scholars and historians
for over one-hundred years. During the latter part of the nine-
teenth and early part of the twentieth centuries, leading interna-
tional law scholars studied the Neutrality Crisis and reached two
conclusions. First, they decided that the Washington administra-
tion acted well beyond the obligations of international law, be-
cause, in their view, no clearly established laws of neutrality yet
existed." Second, they commended Washington for developing
rules that eventually became recognized laws of neutrality
through widespread emulation and acceptance by other nations."
Drawing on this scholarship as well as his own independent in-
vestigations, the distinguished legal historian Charles Hyneman
presented the most influential rejection of the law of nations the-
sis in 1934." He made a strong case that international law did not
impose upon the United States a duty of strict neutrality, that
Washington's decision to apply strict neutrality towards France
and Great Britain was a wise but discretionary policy choice, and
that the administration's professed reliance on the law of nations
was a diplomatic artifice to support that policy choice."
11. See CHARLES G. FENWICK, THE NEUTRALITY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 27-28
(1913); WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 540-50 (2d ed. 1884);
AMos S. HERSHEY, THE ESSENTIALS OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW 452-54 (1912); PHILIP
JESSUP, AMERICAN NEUTRALITY AND INTERNATIONAL POLICE 7-11 (1928).
12. See GEOFFREY BUTLER & SIMON MACCOBY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 229-41 (1928); FENWICK, supra note 11, at 15-28; HALL, supra note 11, at 540-50;
HERSHEY, supra note 11, at 452-54; JESSUP, supra note 11, at 7-12; LASSA OPPENHEIM,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 350-58 (2d ed. 1912).
13. See generally CHARLES S. HYNEMAN, THE FIRST AMERICAN NEUTRALITY, (1934)
[hereinafter HYNEMAN, AMERICAN NEUTRALITY]. Hyneman's book is based on his earlier
article, Neutrality During the European Wars of 1792-1815: America's Understanding of
Her Obligations, 34 AM. J. INT'L L. 279 (1930) [hereinafter Hyneman, America's Under-
standing]. Hyneman's principal area of expertise was the founding era. One of his major
works is still a standard contemporary reference. See AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DUR-
ING THE FOUNDING ERA: 1760-1805 (Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz eds., 1983)
(reprint 1983). A Westlaw search shows that Hyneman's works were cited in 149 law re-
view articles published between 1992 and 2010.
14. See HYNEMAN, AMERICAN NEUTRALITY, supra note 13, at 13-16; Hyneman, Ameri-
ca's Understanding, supra note 13, at 281-82, 284.
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Although, as a careful historian, Hyneman cautiously qualified
his conclusions," his study has entered the canon of conventional
wisdom as definitive. Modern historians and legal scholars of the
Neutrality Crisis, including the leading authorities on the federal-
ist period, uniformly rely on Hyneman's work and maintain that,
contrary to its public declarations, considerations of policy and not
of law determined the Washington administration's actions during
the Neutrality Crisis." From my review of the literature, it ap-
pears that no one has challenged his study or conclusions." This
paper analyzes the evidence and conclusions of Hyneman, and
those who agree with him, and asserts that they are wrong.
This position of Hyneman and other scholars hinges on the
proposition that Washington was free under international law to
have chosen a "benevolent" neutrality favoring one of the belliger-
ents (presumably France) rather than strict neutrality." In short,
no established "law" existed that the President was executing. To
analyze this position, it is necessary to understand the historical
context in which the Neutrality Crisis arose, the different forms of
neutrality then in practice, and the choice that Washington made
in setting the nation's course.
15. See HYNEMAN, AMERICAN NEUTRALITY, supra note 13, at 16 ("[O]ne remains in
doubt . . . ."); Hyneman, America's Understanding, supra note 13, at 285 ("One must, of
course, be cautious. . . . The discussion in the foregoing paragraphs may justify nothing
more than a query.. . .").
16. See STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM: THE EARLY
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1788-1800, at 336, 816 n.100 (1993). For others who rely on Hyne-
man, see, for example, ALEXANDER DECONDE, ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 195 & n.85 (1958);
STEWART JAY, MOST HUMBLE SERVANTS: THE ADVISORY ROLE OF EARLY JUDGES 121, 263
nn.26-27 (1997) [hereinafter JAY, HUMBLE SERVANTS]; RAMSEY, supra note 1, at 79-80, 408
n.33; William R. Casto, Foreign Affairs Crises and the Constitution's Case or Controversy
Limitation: Notes from the Founding Era, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 237, 255-56 & n.118
(2004); Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 1, at 333-34 & n.447. See also CASTO, FOREIGN AF-
FAIRS, supra note 1, at 22 (stating that Washington's position of strict neutrality "was es-
sentially a matter of real politik"); JERALD A. COMBS, THE JAY TREATY 107 (1970) (stating
the same position but without citing authority).
17. A recent article asserts that the law of nations provides a constitutional basis for
the Neutrality Proclamation and other actions by the Washington administration during
the Neutrality Crisis, but it does not address or refute Hyneman's position, nor does it deal
with the authorities of the law of nations upon which the administration relied. See Golove
& Hulsebosch, supra note 1, at 1020-22; see also Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 1, at 680-
83 (making the same assertion and omissions concerning the Neutrality Proclamation).
18. See HYNEMAN, AMERICAN NEUTRALITY, supra note 13, at 15-16.
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III. NEUTRALITY AND THE LAW OF NATIONS
When France declared war on Great Britain and the Nether-
lands on February 1, 1793, the United States had treaties with
the belligerents that dated from the War of Independence. Recip-
rocal pledges of perpetual peace were in place with Britain,"
France,20 and the Netherlands.2 1 The United States also had a lim-
ited "defensive" alliance with France.2 2 In return for France's
pledge to guarantee American independence, the United States
guaranteed French possessions in the West Indies.2 3 No statute or
declaration of Congress authorized military action against any
nation. Congress adjourned (without knowing that the war had
started) leaving the United States in a legal state of peace. The
United States was therefore a neutral in the war. Moreover, the
administration would have violated the nation's treaty obligations
by engaging in military action against any of the belligerents. 24
Thus, the question confronting the Washington administration
was not whether the United States was in a neutral position in
respect to the wars between the European powers. The issue was
what kind of neutrality the United States should adopt. Two
choices existed: "strict" neutrality or "benevolent" neutrality.
A. Strict and Benevolent Neutrality
The classic formulation of strict neutrality was provided by the
continental publicist Emmerich de Vattel in his influential trea-
tise, The Law of Nations:
Neutral Nations are those which take no part in a war, and remain
friends of both parties, without favoring either side to the prejudice of
the other.
19. Definitive Treaty of Peace, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Sept. 3, 1783, art. VII, 8 Stat. 80, 83.
20. Treaty of Amity and Commerce, U.S.-Fr., Feb. 6, 1778, art. I, 8 Stat. 12, 14.
21. Treaty of Amity and Commerce, U.S.-Neth., Oct. 8, 1782, art. I, 8 Stat. 32, 32.
22. Treaty of Alliance, U.S.-Fr., Feb. 6, 1778, art. I-II, 8 Stat. 6, 6, 8.
23. Id. at art. XI, 8 Stat. at 10.
24. That is, unless Britain attacked France's West Indies possessions and France de-
manded that the United States execute the guarantee in the Treaty of Alliance (which it
did not). Spain became a member of the First Coalition against France. JOHN D. HABRON,
TRAFALGAR AND THE SPANISH NAVY: THE SPANISH EXPERIENCE OF SEA POWER 116-17
(1988). Although the United States did not have a treaty with Spain, the countries were at
peace. Hostilities against Spain were not authorized by any congressional legislation and
would likely have precipitated a war with its ally Great Britain.
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. . . So long as a neutral Nation desires to be secure in the enjoy-
ment of its neutrality, it must show itself in all respects strictly im-
partial towards the belligerents; for if it favors one to the prejudice of
the other, it can not complain if the latter treats it as an adherent
and ally of the enemy. Its neutrality would be a hypocritical neu-
trality, of which no State would consent to be the dupe. A sovereign
sometimes submits to such conduct because he is not in a position to
resent it. . . . But we are here seeking to determine what may be
done of right, . . . what are the elements of this impartiality which a
neutral Nation must observe.
It relates solely to what may be done in time of war, and includes
two things: (1) To give no help, when we are not under obligation to
do so, nor voluntarily to furnish either troops, arms, or munitions, or
anything that can be directly made use of in the war. I say "to give no
help," and not "to give equal help"; for it would be absurd for a State
to assist at the same time both enemies, and besides it would be im-
possible to assist them both equally, . .. (2) In all that does not bear
upon the war a neutral and impartial Nation must not refuse to one
of the parties, because of his present quarrel, what it grants to the
other. This does not deprive it of the right to keep in view the best in-
terests of the State when establishing relations of friendship or of
commerce.... But if it should refuse any of those things to one of the
parties merely because he was at war with the other, and because it
desired to favor his opponent, it would be departing from the line of
25
strict neutrality.
According to Vattel, the only exception to the prohibition of mili-
tary-related aid to any of the belligerents was that a nation could
fulfill its obligations under a preexisting treaty, including provid-
ing moderate assistance pursuant to a defensive alliance, while
still maintaining neutrality.26
In contrast to strict neutrality, a nation practicing "benevolent"
neutrality would give military-related support and other prefer-
ences to a belligerent short of engaging in military action." This
form of neutrality, although denounced as "hypocritical" by Vat-
tel,2 8 was frequently practiced in Europe and was precisely what
France wanted and expected from the United States.29
The revolutionary Girondin government instructed its new min-
ister to the United States, Edmond Genet, not to invoke the guar-
25. EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW
bk. III, §§ 103-04, at 268 (Charles G. Fenwick trans., Carnegie Inst. of Wash. 1916) (1758).
26. Id. § 105, at 268.
27. HYNEMAN, AMERICAN NEUTRALITY, supra note 13, at 15-16.
28. VATTEL, supra note 25, bk. III, § 104, at 268.
29. HYNEMAN, AMERICAN NEUTRALITY, supra note 13, at 153-54.
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antee of the French West Indies possessions in the Treaty of Alli-
ance because, if honored, that could draw the United States into
the war."o Instead, Genet should, if possible, use a neutral United
States as a base for French military operations against Great
Britain and its allies." Genet brought about three-hundred blank
commissions for privateers to operate out of American ports and
prey on British shipping." The privateers, as well as the regular
French navy, would bring their prizes into American ports and
sell them, with title established by admiralty courts operated by
French consuls in the United States." For a fleet of this magni-
tude, Genet would recruit politically sympathetic and entrepre-
neurial Americans." To inflict more damage, Genet was to negoti-
ate a new treaty of commerce with the United States, which in
return for French concessions would discriminate against Brit-
ain." Finally, Genet's most ambitious plan was to incite revolu-
tions in Canada, Louisiana, and Florida with secret agents, prop-
agandists, and American "volunteers."" He intended to fund these
audacious projects through the sales of prizes and the receipt of
advance payments by the United States on its debt to France."
The Girondin government understood that these plans were de-
pendent upon cooperation by the United States. It cautioned
Genet to proceed only to the extent that the United States gov-
ernment was willing, and it warned him that "at least for some
time the Americans will observe an absolute neutrality." But
30. See HARRY AMMON, THE GENET MISSION 28 (1973); ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra
note 16, at 334. France's decision to abstain from invoking the guarantee was fortunate for
the United States, because Great Britain invaded the French West Indies. See THOMAS 0.
OTT, THE HAITIAN REVOLUTION 1789-1804, at 76-77 (1973). The first British campaign
resulted in the quick seizure of Tobago in April 1793. Id. at 77. Britain invaded St.
Domingue (now Haiti) in September 1793. Id. at 77-78. That invasion began a five-year
war which ultimately resulted in British defeat and withdrawal. Id. at 76-120.
31. See ELKINS & McKITRICK, supra note 16, at 335.
32. Id. at 333; Letter from Minister of the Marine to Citizen Genet (Feb. 8, 1793), re-
printed in AUTHENTIC COPIES OF THE CORRESPONDENCE OF THOMAS JEFFERSON AND
GEORGE HAMMOND: PART II 9, 9 (London, J. Debrett 1794).
33. ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 16, at 334, 353.
34. See id. at 333. Privateering was a legalized form of piracy. Under the then-
prevailing rules, the prize (the captured ship andlor its cargo) would be condemned by the
captor's admiralty court and sold, with a portion of the proceeds going to the master and
crew of the privateer. See VArrEL, supra note 25, bk. III, § 229, at 319.
35. See AMMON, supra note 30, at 26; ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 16, at 333.
36. On Genet's instructions and plans, see AMMON, supra note 30, at 27; ELKINS &
MCKITRICK, supra note 16, at 333.
37. See ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 16, at 334.
38. Id. at 333 (quoting instructions) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Genet, who already had earned the reputation of a controversial
and impetuous diplomat," arrived in Charleston (instead of Phil-
adelphia) on April 8, 1793, and he promptly commissioned four
French privateers manned largely with American sailors, estab-
lished an admiralty court to be operated by the French consul,
and began planning an expedition into Florida-all without seek-
ing permission from, or even consulting, the Washington admin-
istration.40 He seemed certain that the United States would sup-
port his plans by adopting a "benevolent" neutrality in favor of
France.41
Genet's expectations may look fanciful in hindsight, but he had
reasons to believe that the Washington administration would co-
operate. Public opinion in the United States was heavily pro-
French, because many Americans viewed the French Revolution
as an image of their own, felt gratitude for France's support of the
United States during the War of Independence, and harbored con-
tinued hostility towards and distrust of their former colonial mas-
ters.42 It was also not unreasonable for Genet to expect reciprocity
for the position that France had taken during the American Revo-
lution. Until the February 1778 treaties with the United States,
France maintained a public stance of neutrality while providing
the Americans with huge loans, equipping Washington's army by
shipping contraband through a "private" firm, allowing American
privateers to use French ports as bases for preying on British
shipping (in violation of its treaty with Britain), and collaborating
in building three vessels of war for the American navy.4
Moreover, the Franco-American treaties did not explicitly pro-
hibit the United States from giving this kind of support to France.
Genet had a plausible argument that his position on privateering
39. Genet had been the French ambassador to Russia but was expelled from that coun-
try because of his public advocacy of revolutionary principles. See id. at 331. Morris told
Washington that Genet was a person of genius but that he had exceeded his instructions in
Russia, had an explosive temper, and reacted petulantly when criticized. Letter from Gou-
verneur Morris to George Washington (Dec. 28, 1792), in 11 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASH-
INGTON, 559, 561-62 (Christine Sternberg Patrick ed., 2002).
40. ELIGNS & McKITRICK, supra note 16, at 335.
41. See id. at 346.
42. See id. at 346, 364.
43. SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS, A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 20-25 (4th
ed. 1955) [hereinafter BEMIS, DIPLOMATIC HISTORY]; SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS, THE DIPLOMA-
CY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 53-55 (1957). The harassment of British shipping in the
English Channel by American privateers was so successful that insurance rates were in-
creased by more than twenty percent. Id. at 54-55.
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was at least consistent with, and arguably required by, the Treaty
of Amity and Commerce." Article XVII of the treaty authorized
French ships of war and privateers to freely bring captured prizes
into United States ports, while denying the same privilege to
Britain." Other provisions of the treaty were subject to interpreta-
tion. Article XXII prohibited Britain from fitting out privateers in
the United States but was silent on whether France could engage
in those activities.4 ' Article XIX allowed French ships of war to
obtain asylum in American ports but was silent about whether
that privilege applied to British ships.4 ' These articles could have
been interpreted as providing for benevolent neutrality-that by
negative implication, the treaty allowed France to fit out priva-
teers to prey on British shipping and denied asylum to British
ships of war."
Finally, Genet had some reason to believe that he could secure
a large advance payment against the French debt to fund his am-
bitious operations. The Washington administration had made
such payments to France before the war with Britain.4 9 In August
1791, a great slave revolt erupted in the French colony of St.
Domingue (now Haiti)."o The colonial planters' regime requested
support from the United States, and the Washington administra-
tion provided it with $726,000 for the purchase of arms, ammuni-
tion, and other supplies between September 1791 and January
1793.51 The payments were made to Genet's predecessor, Ternant,
and were deemed advances against the French revolutionary war
debt."
44. ELKINS & McKITRICK, supra note 16, at 346.
45. Treaty of Amity & Commerce, supra note 20, at art. XVII, 8 Stat. at 22. This Arti-
cle, as well as the two that follow in the text, applied to all enemies of France. For simplici-
ty, I use Britain as shorthand.
46. See id. at art. XXII, 8 Stat. at 24.
47. Id. at art. XIX, 8 Stat. at 22, 24.
48. AMMON, supra note 30, at 75-76; CASTO, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 1, at 17.
49. See OTT, supra note 30, at 54.
50. Id. at 42.
51. Timothy M. Matthewson, George Washington's Policy Toward the Haitian Revolu-
tion, in 3 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY 321, 326-33 (1970).
52. Id. American support was insufficient, and the colonial regime collapsed in June
1793. Id. at 334; see also DECONDE, supra note 16, at 272-74; OTT, supra note 30, at 65-72.
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B. The Choice of Strict Neutrality
Washington and his Cabinet chose strict neutrality. When
Thomas Jefferson, the Secretary of State, determined that war
had indeed broken out between France and Britain and the Neth-
erlands, he wrote to Washington, who was at Mount Vernon, that
it was "necessary in my opinion that we take every justifiable
measure for preserving our neutrality."5 3 From Paris, the Ameri-
can minister Gouverneur Morris sent the administration an ur-
gent warning that, while he expected the United States to "strictly
observe the Laws of Nations and rigidly adhere to their Neutrali-
ty," Genet's commissions for privateers "might expose us to Suspi-
cion and finally involve us in War."54 Washington sent the follow-
ing directive to the Cabinet:
War having actually commenced between France and Great Britain,
it behoves the Government of this Country to use every means in it's
power to prevent the citizens thereof from embroiling us with either
of those powers, by endeavouring to maintain a strict neutrality. I
therefore require that you will give the subject mature consideration,
that such measures as shall be deemed most likely to effect this de-
sirable purpose may be adopted without delay; for I have understood
that vessels are already designated as Privateers, and preparing ac-
cordingly.55
The administration then implemented the policy of strict neu-
trality by denying to all of the belligerents, including France, any
military-related support, except as explicitly obligated by treaty."
The administration adhered to the treaty requirement that
France, but not her enemies, could bring prizes into United States
ports.5 ' But it thwarted all of Genet's designs. The administration
interpreted the treaty as not authorizing France to fit out priva-
teers in United States ports and, to achieve a strict impartiality,
53. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Washington (Apr. 7, 1793), in 25 THE PA-
PERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 518, 518. Although France declared war on
Britain and the Netherlands on February 1, 1793, it took over two months for Americans to
receive definite confirmation that the war had begun because of particularly bad weather
in the Atlantic. CASTO, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 1, at 19.
54. Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 7, 1793), in 25 THE PA-
PERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 333, 333.
55. Letter to George Washington to Cabinet (Apr. 12, 1793), in 25 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 541, 541 (emphasis added).,
56. See AMMON, supra note 30, at 67.
57. See id.
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prohibited France from doing so." Similarly, the administration
read the treaty as not prohibiting British ships of war from ob-
taining asylum in United States ports and, to achieve equality of
treatment, held that the British warships would enjoy the same
privileges as the French." The administration prohibited all of the
belligerents from recruiting Americans for military service and
held that the establishment of French consular courts in the Unit-
ed States for adjudicating title to prizes was illegal-a "mere nul-
lity."60 And the administration refused to make a new commercial
treaty with France that would discriminate against Britain.6 1
The administration's position of strict neutrality was succinctly
stated by Jefferson to Genet on June 5, 1793 in response to
Genet's strenuous complaints of how the United States was inter-
preting the treaties:
The respect due to whatever comes from you, friendship for the
[F]rench nation and justice to all, have induced [the President] to re-
examine the subject, and particularly to give your representations
thereon, the consideration they deservedly claim. After fully weighing
again however all the principles and circumstances of the case, the
result appears still to be that it is the right of every nation to prohibit
acts of sovereignty from being exercised by any other within its lim-
its; and the duty of a neutral nation to prohibit such as would injure
62
one of the warring powers ....
58. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Hammond (May 15, 1793), in 26 THE PA-
PERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 38, 38-40; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
Jean Baptiste Ternant (May 15, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra
note 10, at 42, 42-44; Cabinet Memorandum on French Privateers (June 1, 1793), in 26
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 155, 155; Letter from Thomas Jef-
ferson to Edmond Charles Genet (June 17, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFER-
SON, supra note 10, at 297, 297-300; Cabinet Opinion on Prizes and Privateers (Aug. 3,
1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 603, 603-04.
59. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Hammond and F. P. Van Berckel (Sept. 9,
1793), in 27 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 70, 70-71.
60. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Hammond (May 15, 1793), in 26 THE PA-
PERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 38, 38-40; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
Jean Baptiste Ternant (May 15, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra
note 10, at 42, 42-44; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond Charles Genet (June 5,
1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 195, 195-96; Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond Charles Genet (July 16, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 510, 511-13.
61. See ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 16, at 333-34.
62. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond Charles Genet (June 5, 1793), in 26 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 195.
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Six days later, the administration refused Genet's request for ad-
vanced payments on the debt."
Genet and France "had expected a benevolent American neu-
trality, under which French actions, while exacerbating, would
not have been construed as violations of American neutrality. This
kind of neutrality Genet did not get."64
C. The Critique of the Law of Nations Thesis
The claim that Washington was not executing the law of na-
tions is that his choice of strict neutrality, instead of benevolent
neutrality, was wise policy but was not required by international
law. Strict neutrality was surely the safest means of keeping the
United States out of the war." Had the administration supported
Genet's plan for using United States ports as bases for preying on
British ships, the result could have been a calamitous war with
Great Britain." The policy of strict neutrality was embraced by
the entire Cabinet-both by Alexander Hamilton, the Secretary of
the Treasury, who was alarmed by the French reign of terror and
wished above all to avoid war with Great Britain, and by Jeffer-
son, an Anglophobe whose every moral and political instinct fa-
vored revolutionary France.6 7 The Washington administration un-
63. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond Charles Genet (June 11, 1793), in 26
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 252, 252. When the administration
decided on strict neutrality, it ceased providing financial or other support to suppress the
slave revolt in St. Domingue. See Matthewson, supra note 51, at 335.
64. DECONDE, supra note 16, at 233.
65. See HYNEMAN, AMERICAN NEUTRALITY, supra note 13, at 19.
66. See ELKINS & McKITRICK, supra note 16, at 334.
67. Some authors claim that Jefferson advocated a benevolent neutrality in favor of
France. E.g., AMMON, supra note 30, at 51; COMBS, supra note 16, at 109-13; DECONDE,
supra note 16, at 109-13. From his earliest decisions during the Neutrality Crisis, Jeffer-
son adopted the position of strict neutrality. In his official and private opinions to Wash-
ington, Jefferson interpreted the French treaties according to strict neutrality. On the key
question of arming privateers, Jefferson examined whether a danger to the United States
existed because Article XXII of the commercial treaty with France prohibited the enemies
of France from fitting out privateers in U.S. ports. Opinion on Treaties with France (Apr.
28, 1793), in 25 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 608, 611. He con-
cluded that no danger was present: "But we are free to refuse the same thing to France,
there being no stipulation to the contrary, and we ought to refuse it on principles of fair
neutrality." Id. In another early official and private opinion to Washington, Jefferson em-
phasized the same need to interpret the treaties according to strict neutrality, which he
called "a fair and secure neutrality." Opinion on the Restoration of Prizes (May 16, 1793),
in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 50, 50. Jefferson made the
same point to his closest ally and friend, James Madison, and to his teacher, George
Wythe. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Apr. 28, 1793), in 25 THE PAPERS
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questionably adopted the policy that it thought was in the best
interest of the United States. Moreover, a clear political ad-
vantage was evident in placing diplomatic reliance on the law of
nations. The United States was a weak nation caught in the
crosswinds of two powerful and rapacious countries. It is a truism
that weak nations tend to embrace international law when it can
be empowering, while strong nations tend to disdain international
law when it is restraining.
This article does not take issue with any of the foregoing points.
A policy of strict neutrality relying on the obligations of interna-
tional law was almost certainly the best means of keeping the
United States out of the war. There is no reason to doubt that
Washington wanted to adopt strict neutrality. But, in the absence
of any authorizing congressional legislation, that does not answer
the question of how the Executive had the power to adopt that pol-
icy. Did the law of nations provide the legal authority for the ad-
ministration's neutrality policy, and did the law of nations also
place restraints on the administration's discretion?
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 619, 619 ("I fear that a fair neutrality will prove
a disagreeable pill to our friends, tho' necessary to keep us out of the calamities of a war.");
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Wythe (Apr. 27, 1793), in 25 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 597, 597 ("We shall be a little embarrassed occa-
sionally till we feel ourselves firmly seated in the saddle of neutrality.").
With one exception (the continued validity of the French treaties), substantial agreement
existed in the Cabinet on how the policy of strict neutrality should be implemented. HYNE-
MAN, AMERICAN NEUTRALITY, supra note 13, at 21-23. To be sure, the political and person-
al animosity and distrust between Hamilton and Jefferson were so toxic that "relatively
minor" differences were exaggerated into matters of principle. ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra
note 16, at 336. ("There was thus an inordinate amount of quibbling and hair-splitting. But
at any point of clear choice between the national interest and something else, despite pri-
vate grumblings nobody really hesitated; there were few doubts as to what the national
interest was."). "Nor did [Jefferson] seriously advocate-as some writers have carelessly
claimed-a 'benevolent' neutrality toward France, being fully aware of the dangers such a
course would invite." Id. at 338; see also CASTO, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 1, at 162-63;
CHARLES MARION THOMAS, AMERICAN NEUTRALITY IN 1793, at 35, 51, 56-62 (1967).
As for Hamilton, given the Franco-American treaties and the widespread public support
for France, the most that he could realistically do to favor Britain was to challenge the
continued validity of the treaties but otherwise advocate strict neutrality, which he did
with his usual energy and passion. See, e.g., Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George
Washington (May 15, 1793), in 14 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 454, 454-55
(Harold C. Syrett ed., 1969) (quoting Vattel to the effect that recruiting soldiers in a foreign
country without the consent of the host is a violation of the law of nations and that the
offender (Genet?) should be hanged). For the sake of brevity, subsequent citations to the
volumes of The Papers of Alexander Hamilton edited by Harold C. Syrett omit editor and
publication information.
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Historians and other scholars who reject the law of nations the-
sis are certain that it did neither, on the following grounds. Prec-
edents of strict neutrality existed in Europe, but these declara-
tions "were beyond doubt entirely unknown to members of the
American government in 1793," because they made no references
to them during the Neutrality Crisis.68 Moreover, for every in-
stance that one could cite of a European country adopting strict
neutrality, at least as many instances prevailed in which Europe-
an countries practiced benevolent neutrality. In the practice of
nations, no consensus was in place on the actual requirements of
neutrality, and hence no generally accepted principle of interna-
tional law existed upon which Washington could have relied.69
Strict impartiality was the doctrine expressed by continental pub-
licists such as Grotius,o Bynkershoek," Wolff,72 and Vattel,"
68. HYNEMAN, AMERICAN NEUTRALITY, supra note 13, at 16.
69. Id. at 15-16; see supra note 11 and accompanying text.
70. HUGO GROTIUs, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE bk. III, ch. XVII, II, at 377-78
(A.C. Campbell trans., 1901) (1625).
71. CORNELIUS VAN BYNKERSHOEK, 2 QUAESTIONUM JURIS PUBLICI LIBRI Duo bk I, ch.
IX, at 61-63 (Tenney Frank trans., 1930) (1737).
72. CHRISTIAN WOLFF, 2 Jus GENTIUM METHODO SCIENTIFA PERTRACTATUM, ch. VI, §§
672-75, 683-84, at 346-48, 352-53 (Joseph H. Drake trans. 1934) (1764).
73. VATTEL, supra note 25, bk. III, §§ 103-04, at 268. Prakash and Ramsey assert
that Vattel also endorsed the alternative of benevolent neutrality, relying on the following
quotes from his treatise:
Vattel, writing in the eighteenth century, observed that nonbelligerent na-
tions often "furnish[ed] a determined succour, allow[ed] some troops to be
raised, or advance[d] money" to one side without provoking retaliation and
commented that "this prudent caution in not always coming to an open break
with those who give such help to an enemy. . . has gradually given rise to the
custom of not regarding such assistance . . . as an act of hostility."
Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 1, at 333 n.447 (alteration in original) (quoting VATTEL,
supra note 25, bk. III, § 97, at 265). These quotes are selectively taken out of context and
misstate Vattel's position on neutrality. They are taken from a chapter of The Law of Na-
tions, entitled "The Enemy's Allies; Leagues of War; Auxiliaries; Subsidies," that deals with
the opposite of neutrality. In the very paragraph containing the excerpts quoted by Pra-
kash and Ramsey, Vattel states: "I account as allies of my enemy those who aid him in his
war without being under treaty obligation to do so." VATTEL, supra note 25, bk. III, § 97, at
265 (emphasis added). Vattel then observes that for reasons of prudence, "I may overlook
that ground of complaint, but I should be justified in calling them to account for it," and
"while prudence may make a Nation refrain from exerting its full right, the right is not
thereby lost." Id. Vattel's position quite clearly was that a nation providing such support to
a belligerent was in fact its ally, and not a neutral, but that the offended nation might not
declare war on the ally because of military and political realities-"in order not to force
them [the allies] to support him [the enemy] with all their strength." Id. The error in en-
listing Vattel as endorsing benevolent neutrality should have been obvious because his
doctrines on neutrality are in the chapter that follows, "Neutrality, and the Passage of
Troops Through a Neutral Country." Id. §§ 103-35, at 268-78. There, Vattel states une-
quivocally that a nation engaging in the conduct described by Prakash and Ramsey would
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whom the Washington administration frequently cited.14 But the
authoritativeness of these writers "will hardly be convincing when
it is noted that their opinions ... were based more on considera-
tions of natural law than on observations of the practice of na-
tions."" Thus, the administration's official statements to the bel-
ligerents may have been rationalizations for the Cabinet's policy
choices. "The law made me do it" is an effective diplomatic tool
that a weak nation can use as a cover for predetermined foreign
policy decisions."
A careful examination of the relevant historical sources shows
that each of these premises is incorrect. The Washington admin-
istration was keenly aware of the precedents of strict neutrality;
convincing reasons existed for the administration to reject Euro-
pean practice as prescribing the law of nations and instead to re-
gard the continental publicists as authoritative; and no disjunc-
tion subsists between the official announcements and the Cabinet
deliberations. The intersection of international and domestic con-
stitutional law in the Take Care Clause provided the administra-
tion with the legal authority that it needed.
D. The Strict Neutrality Precedents
Benjamin Franklin and John Adams were the accredited minis-
ters to the court of France following that country's recognition of
American independence in 1778." On April 10, 1780, Adams ex-
citedly reported to Congress that Catherine II of Russia had taken
an action that "is of too much importance to the United States of
America and their allies to be omitted to be sent to Congress."8 He
forwarded the Empress's declaration that Russia would continue
"to maintain during the present war the strictest neutrality" while
inviting other countries to join with Russia in forming the League
be practicing "a hypocritical neutrality.... A sovereign sometimes submits to such conduct
because he is not in a position to resent it . . . . But we are here seeking to determine what
may be done of right, not what prudence may suggest under the circumstances." Id. § 104,
at 268.
74. HYNEMAN, AMERICAN NEUTRALITY, supra note 13, at 13-14.
75. Id. at 15.
76. Id. at 17-19; see also, e.g., Jay, supra note 7, at 838-46.
77. ANDREW STOCKLEY, BRITAIN AND FRANCE AT THE BIRTH OF AMERICA 3, 12 (2001).
78. Letter from John Adams to the President of Congress (Apr. 10, 1780), in 3 THE
REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 606, 606 (Francis
Wharton ed., 1889) [hereinafter REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE].
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of Armed Neutrality." This group would be a coalition of neutrals
that would practice "perfect neutrality" towards belligerents on
the condition that the belligerents would respect a principle of
neutral rights that went beyond what was then required by the
law of nations-that all goods except contraband belonging to the
subjects of the belligerent powers shall be immune from seizure in
neutral ships (the principle that "free ships make free goods").80
Adams subsequently transmitted to Congress the declarations of
the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, and Austria that they would
maintain strict neutrality during the war and had joined the
League of Armed Neutrality.81
Portugal was a special case. It practiced "benevolent" neutrality
in favor of Great Britain by allowing armed vessels commissioned
by Britain to use its ports while denying that privilege to France,
Spain, and America." Adams complained bitterly to Congress of
Portugal's position: "If she is neutral, let her be neutral; not say
she is neutral, and be otherwise." Portugal would change its po-
sition, and Adams reported with satisfaction when Portugal de-
clared "exact neutrality" and banned all privateers and prizes
from entering or remaining in its ports.84
Franklin and Adams immediately understood the importance of
the declarations of strict neutrality and the formation of the
League of Armed Neutrality." Not only would the League guaran-
79. Id. at 606-07.
80. Id. at 606-08.
81. Letter from John Adams to the President of Congress (Apr. 28, 1780), in 3 REVO-
LUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 78, at 635, 635-39 (declaration of
Holland of "scrupulous neutrality"); Letter from John Adams to the President of Congress
(Aug. 14, 1780), in 4 REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 78, at 29,
29-32 (declaration of Sweden of "perfect neutrality," and declaration of Denmark of "neu-
trality the most exact and most perfect"); Letter from John Adams to the President of Con-
gress (Jan. 15, 1781), in 4 REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 78,
at 234, 234 (declaration of the States General of the Netherlands of "the most strict and
most perfect neutrality"); Letter from John Adams to the President of Congress (Dec. 29,
1781), in 5 REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 78, at 77, 77-79
(declaration of Austria of the "most strict neutrality and the most exact impartiality").
82. See Letter from John Adams to John Jay (May 15, 1780), in 3 REVOLUTIONARY
DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 78, at 678, 678; see also James W. Garner, The
Violation of Neutral Territory, 9 AM. J. INT'L L. 72, 82 (1915).
83. Letter from John Adams to John Jay (May 15, 1780), in 3 REVOLUTIONARY DIPLO-
MATIC CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 78, at 678, 678-79.
84. Letter from John Adams to the President of Congress (Oct. 6, 1780), in 4 REVOLU-
TIONARY DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 78, at 83, 83-84.
85. See Letter from Benjamin Franklin to the President of Congress (May 31, 1780), in
3 REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 78, at 742, 745; Letter from
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tee that the Royal Navy would be unable to intercept commerce
(except contraband) from neutral countries to the United States,
France, and Spain, but Britain was now in a hot war with France
and Spain and in a cold war with practically the rest of Europe."
As the League began to develop, Franklin, on his own initiative,
ordered American privateers operating out of France to cease in-
tercepting neutral ships carrying British goods and prophetically
told Congress: "In truth, that country [Great Britain] seems to
have no friends on this side of the water; no other nation wishes it
success in its present war, but rather desires to see it effectually
humbled; no one, not even their old friends the Dutch, will afford
them any assistance."" And Adams sent a message to the same
effect after the League was formed:
I think it can be no longer doubted that Russia will never take part
with England, and that while she is determined upon a neutrality,
every other maritime power of Europe must do the same or join
against England. It is equally plain that England must come into the
system of rights preparing for neutrals or go to war with all the mari-
time powers of the world. This is too decisively and obviously advan-
88
tageous to North America to need any comments.
Congress readily joined France and Spain in agreeing to the
League's conditions."
Hyneman and other critics are therefore plainly incorrect in as-
serting that the Washington administration was unaware of the
European declarations of strict neutrality. These declarations
were momentous events that the nation's leadership could hardly
John Adams to the President of Congress (July 15, 1780), in 3 REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMAT-
IC CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 78, at 859, 860.
86. BRENDAN SIMMs, THREE VICTORIES AND A DEFEAT: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE
FIRST BRITISH EMPIRE, 1714-1783, at 642-45 (2007); see also GEORGE C. HERRING, FROM
COLONY TO SUPERPOWER: U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS SINCE 1776, at 23 (2008).
87. Letter from Benjamin Franklin to the President of Congress (May 31, 1780), in 3
REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 78, at 742, 745.
88. Letter from John Adams to the President of Congress (July 15, 1780), in 3 REVO-
LUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 78, at 859, 860.
89. 18 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 865-67, 905 (Gail-
hard Hunt ed., 1910). Congress had sent Francis Dana to Russia as a "minister-designate"
to seek recognition of the United States, which Catherine II refused. When Congress
learned of Catherine II's actions with the other neutral states, Dana was instructed to
pursue recognition with great patience, because, having created the League of Armed Neu-
trality, Catherine II must maintain the "strictest impartiality" and that "[alt this critical
moment it could hardly be expected that she would publicly entertain a minister from the
United States." Letter from Robert Livingston to Dana (May 10, 1782), in 5 REVOLUTION-
ARY DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 78, at 411, 411 (Actually, Russia would not
recognize the United States until 1809).
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have forgotten, and they were reported to the country by the per-
son who would be the Vice President in Washington's administra-
tion.
These precedents would appear strongly to support Washing-
ton's choice of strict neutrality, yet the administration did not rely
on them during the Neutrality Crisis. Perhaps this was because
these events were so well known that they did not have to be cit-
ed. Or perhaps the administration did not rely on them because
those precedents would have been negated by the number of con-
trary instances of benevolent neutrality by European nations. The
central point of Hyneman and other critics is that there was no
consensus in the practices of nations from which a binding law of
neutrality could be derived and the recitation of strict neutrality
declarations by European nations during the War of Independence
would not have refuted that point.
This critique necessarily assumes that the Washington admin-
istration should have drawn its doctrines of international law
from the practices of European nations. But, for good reasons,
American lawyers, judges, and statesmen did not regard Europe-
an practice as the source of the law of nations.
During the eighteenth century, European ministries professed
that a law of nations was in place containing rules that governed
international behavior, but violation of, and not adherence to,
those rules was the norm. Even for rules of international law that
were said to be universally accepted,
the whole diplomacy of the time aimed to evade or to violate them as
much as was consistent with political safety, with the result that
there existed a regime of policies rather than of laws, and one which
pretended an observance of forms rather than the spirit of interna-
90
tional equity.
90. JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., THE RECOGNITION POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 73 (1915);
see also, e.g., BEMIS, DIPLOMATIC HISTORY, supra note 43, at 15 (European states in the
eighteenth century conducted their foreign policies "according to the naked principles of
Machiavelli, holding that a good object of state justified the employment of any means. A
good end meant the advancement of one's own nation at the expense of others."). The Eu-
ropean monarchies were not restrained by elementary legal doctrines. See id. at 15-16
(stating that despite time-honored principles, even the dispatches of ambassadors were not
safe; and ministries did not hesitate to employ secret practices including "dissimulation,
deception, espionage, bribery, treachery, robbery and even assassination" to advance their
nations' interests); HERRING, supra note 86, at 69 (treaties were regularly violated when
ministries thought necessary); FRANCIS STEPHEN RUDDY, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE EN-
LIGHTENMENT: THE BACKGROUND OF EMMERICH DE VATTEL'S LE DROIT DES GENS 38-43
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This norm was not a model that would be naturally adopted by a
new republic that professed a devotion to the rule of law"--one
that, in the words of Chief Justice Marshall, who idolized Wash-
ington, had established "a government of laws, and not of men."9
Instead of using European practices as the bases of the law of
nations, the founding generation relied on the natural law doc-
trines propounded by the continental publicists. An early incident
during the Neutrality Crisis provides a good example. Britain's
minister to the United States, George Hammond, complained that
the seizure of the British ship Grange by a French frigate in the
Delaware Bay violated the law of nations because it occurred in
the territorial waters of the United States and not on the high
seas." Attorney General Edmund Randolph consulted the conti-
nental publicists (particularly his favorite, Vattel) and found that
they were unanimous that a bay such as the Delaware was within
a nation's territorial jurisdiction." This support was enough for
Randolph to issue a formal opinion that the Grange was seized in
neutral waters and that "the duty arising from the illegal act, is
restitution."" As for the relative importance of Vattel and Europe-
an practice, Randolph stated:
If, as Vattel inclines to think in the 294th. Section of his first book,
the Romans were free to appropriate the mediterranean, merely be-
cause they secured by one single stroke the immense range of their
coast; how much stronger must the vindication of the U.S. be, should
they adopt maxims for prohibiting foreigners from gaining, without
permission, access into the heart of their country.
This inquiry might be enlarged by a minute discussion of the prac-
tice of foreign nations in such circumstances. But I pass it by; because
the U.S. in the commencement of their career ought not to be precipi-
tate in declaring their approbation of any usages, (the precise facts
concerning which we may not thoroughly understand) until those us-
ages shall have grown into principles, and are incorporated into the
(1975) (stating that in the maelstrom of political anarchy that characterized European
politics in the eighteenth century, "nothing was sacred, no principle inviolable. [and]
[n]ot even the most explicit treaty arrangements need be honored").
91. On the importance to the founding generation of complying with the law of nations,
see Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 1, at 1018-19.
92. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
93. Memorial from George Hammond (May 2, 1793), in 25 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 637, 637-38.
94. Edmund Randolph's Opinion on the Grange (May 14, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 31, 32-35.
95. Id. at 35.
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law of nations; and because no usage has ever been accepted, which
shakes the foregoing principles.96
This approach to the law of nations was typical for the Wash-
ington administration" and also explains why it did not consider
the United States bound to provide France with the same benevo-
lent neutrality that France had practiced before formally entering
the American War of Independence. Even before the Declaration
of Independence was issued, Louis XVI had accepted his foreign
minister's plan to provide huge secret support for the American
Revolution while maintaining a public posture of neutrality." The
other critical element in the plan was to build up the French navy
for outright military intervention in the war." France's monar-
chical government was hardly motivated by ideological sympathy
with the Americans. Its goals were to obtain revenge for the disas-
trous Seven Years War and to dramatically reduce British pow-
er."o Great Britain protested the French actions but tolerated
them because it did not want France to enter the war."o' More
than in the case of Portugal, France's benevolent neutrality was
neither benevolent nor neutral. It was an outstanding example of
Jefferson's statement to the French government in the Neutrality
Crisis that "favors to one [nation] to the prejudice of the other
would import a fraudulent neutrality, of which no nation would be
the dupe."102
96. Id. Jefferson forwarded Randolph's opinion to the British minister and to the out-
going French minister, with demands that the Grange and its cargo be restored to Britain
and its crew freed. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Hammond (May 15, 1793), in
26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 38, 39; Letter from Thomas Jef-
ferson to Jean Baptiste Ternant (May 15, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON,
supra note 10, 42, 43-44. These demands were then presented to Genet, the new French
minister. ELKINS & MCKITRICKS, supra note 16, at 343. Genet agreed to these demands
(the only time he would do so willingly), but this incident foreshadowed the ensuing conflict
between the United States and France over the meaning of American neutrality. Id.
97. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
98. See JONATHAN R. DULL, A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
60-61 (1985).
99. Id. at 90; HERRING, supra note 86, at 17-20.
100. STOCKLEY, supra note 77, at 132 (The French foreign minister Vergennes, who was
the architect of this policy, frankly explained France's rationale: it "was the significant
weakening of England caused by taking away a third of her empire.") (internal quotation
marks omitted).
101. See SIMMS, supra note 86, at 598-99.
102. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gouverneur Morris (Aug. 16, 1793), in 26 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 697, 699 (letter to French government
requesting recall of Genet).
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The Washington administration did not look to European prac-
tice as the source of the law of nations. When members of the ad-
ministration referred to common usages of nations, it was to those
practices that conformed with their authorities-the treatises on
the law of nations written by the continental publicists.
This reliance on philosophers from non-common law European
countries may seem anomalous. It is explained by the remarkable
correspondence of the jurisprudence, legal doctrines, and moral
values of the continental publicists with those of the founding
generation in America.
IV. THE CONTINENTAL PUBLICISTS
Critics of the law of nations thesis dismiss the Washington ad-
ministration's reliance on the continental publicists, because
"their opinions . .. were based more on considerations of natural
law than on observations of the practice of nations."10 This criti-
cism assumes that legal positivism, with its emphasis on the prac-
tice of nations as evidence of state consent, is the foundation of
international law. That assumption was certainly true when
Hyneman and others wrote in the latter part of the nineteenth
and the early part of the twentieth centuries. The natural law ba-
sis of international law had been thoroughly rejected by then:
Such 'naturalistic' evidence, however, hardly sufficed for the nine-
teenth-century international legal positivists who seemed to need to
see the 'hard' stuff of state practice to demonstrate to themselves and
others that international law was 'real' law. In Wharton's ground-
breaking work [published in 1886], to be followed by dozens of others
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the 'scientific' positivists
would enwrap themselves in the reassuring detail of state practice.10 4
Or, as Edwin D. Dickinson observed in 1932: "At the beginning of
the 20th century, to speak contemptuously of the naturalists,
while avoiding the particulars of the indictment, was to court fa-
vor with the profession. Positivism was indisputably trium-
phant."05
103. HYNEMAN, AMERICAN NEUTRALITY, supra note 13, at 15.
104. MARK WESTON JANIS, THE AMERICAN TRADITION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: GREAT
EXPECTATIONS 1789-1914, at 124 (2004).
105. Dickinson, Changing Concepts, supra note 8, at 253. The definitive treatise on
international law in the twentieth century was Lassa Oppenheim's International Law.
Oppenheim was a pure legal positivist who determined the content of international law
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A. The Founders'Natural Law Jurisprudence
Projecting the jurisprudence of legal positivism onto the found-
ing generation is a fundamental error. American judges, attor-
neys, and others learned in the law during the late eighteenth
century had studied and been indoctrinated with the natural law
doctrines of Coke and Blackstone.o' Blackstone, whose Commen-
taries was the first legal text read by almost all American law-
yers,o' held that positive law that violated natural law was inva-
lid as a matter of conscience; that even judicial decisions are not
the law, but only evidence of what the law is; and that those deci-
sions should be overruled when unjust.'
In the founding generation, virtually all American attorneys
were natural lawyers, and their approach towards law cannot be
circumscribed retrospectively by later accepted doctrines of legal
positivism.' As William R. Casto warned, it is essential to under-
stand the drastic differences between the fundamental principles
of jurisprudence in the twentieth century as compared with those
in the founding era:
When the [Supreme] Court was created, virtually all American attor-
neys were natural lawyers who believed that ... law was a compre-
hensive and systematic body of principles based upon divine wisdom
and the perfection of human reason....
solely on state practice and consent. OPPENHEIM, supra note 12, at 3-4; see JANIS, supra
note 104, at 128-31.
106. Julius Goebel, Jr., The Common Law and the Constitution, in CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN
MARSHALL: A REAPPRAISAL 101, 108-09 (W. Melville Jones ed., 1956).
107. See 2 ANTON-HERMANN CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN AMERICA
78-79 (1965); Roscoe Pound, The Development of Constitutional Guarantees of Liberty, in
20 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 347, 352-53 (1945).
108. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69-71. See also Lord Mansfield's famous
declaration in Jones v. Randall, Lofft 383, 385, 98 Eng. Rep. 706, 707 (K.B. 1774) ("There is
no positive law, nor any case in the books; but Mr. Dunning argues rightly, and I think
very conclusively, that if it is bad upon principle this is sufficient. The law would be a
strange science if it rested solely upon cases; and if after so large an increase of commerce,
arts and circumstances accruing, we must go to the time of Rich. 1 to find a case, and see
what is law. Precedent indeed may serve to fix principles, which for certainty's sake are not
suffered to be shaken, whatever might be the weight of the principle, independent of prece-
dent. But precedent, though it be evidence of law, is not law in itself; much less the whole
of the law.").
109. See WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE CHIEF
JUSTICESHIPS OF JOHN JAY AND OLIVER ELLSWORTH 34-35 (1995) [hereinafter CASTO, SU-
PREME COURT]; see also Pound, supra note 107, at 347, 352-53, 363-64. Julius Goebel as-
tutely observed that the natural law dichotomy between judicial decisions and the common
law allowed American state courts following the Revolution to cite English decisions while
claiming to apply a general common law, and not the law of England. Goebel, supra note
106, at 109-10.
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The difference between legal positivism and natural law is so vast
that many of the Founding Generation's thoughts and actions cannot
be understood without setting positivism aside and studying those
earlier thoughts and actions in their original natural-law context.no
These fundamental differences in jurisprudential principles are
particularly salient in the contrast between the eighteenth centu-
ry's law of nations, which was a product of natural law, and the
subsequent customary international law that emerged from legal
positivism. These differences are reflected in divergent processes
of incorporation into domestic law:
The law of nations was necessarily and literally part of national law
in the 18th century, since the two systems were assumed to rest in
their respective spheres upon the same immutable principles of natu-
ral justice. In the 19th century, with changing concepts of law and of
the limitations of the judicial method, the doctrine of incorporation
assumed more modest proportions ... . [T]he national law governing
matters of international concern is to be derived, in the absence of a
controlling statute, executive decision, or judicial precedent, from
such relevant principles of the law of nations as can be shown to have
received the nation's implied or express assent.in
The continental publicists were apostles of the natural law and
the law of nations, which they expounded was obligatory regard-
less of state practice or consent."' As summarized by Roscoe
Pound, the continental publicists held to four fundamental propo-
sitions:
(1) There are natural rights demonstrable by reason. They are eter-
nal and absolute. They are valid for all men in all times and all plac-
es. (2) Natural law is a body of rules, ascertainable by reason, which
perfectly secures all these natural rights. (3) The state exists only to
secure men in these natural rights. (4) Positive law, the law applied
and enforced in the courts, is a means by which the state performs
this function and is morally binding only so far as it conforms to nat-
ural law." 3
These principles, and their foundation in natural law, fit squarely
with how the founding generation thought about law, and the con-
tinental publicists thereby influenced America in the lead-up to
110. CASTO, SUPREME COURT, supra note 109, at 2.
111. Dickinson, Changing Concepts, supra note 8, at 259-60.
112. The natural lawyers in Great Britain took a similar approach. Lord Mansfield held
that the law of nations was part of the common law of England and referred to the conti-
nental publicists as authorities, as no British writer on the law of nations of similar dis-
tinction existed. Triquet v. Bath, 3 Burrow 1478, 1481, 97 Eng. Rep. 936, 938 (K.B. 1764).
113. Pound, supra note 107, at 364.
402 [Vol. 46:373
EXECUTIVE POWER
the Revolution."' After the Revolution began, in the first cases
tried before the first federal court (established by the Confederat-
ed Congress):
The lawyers turned to these philosophical writers as legal sources in
the way that they would have relied on reported prize cases, if such
had been available. The Court of Appeals clearly thought such reli-
ance was appropriate, that the principles of the law of nations should
be the rule of decision in prize cases. The underlying natural law phi-
losophy on which the law of nations was based struck a resonant
chord with the American bench and bar. Incorporation of the law of
nations, therefore, must have seemed so obvious to eighteenth centu-
115
ry lawyers that there was no reason to question its propriety.
During the founding era, judicial understanding of the law of na-
tions was based on natural law, and the treatises of the continen-
tal publicists were the principal sources of law. As noted by Edwin
D. Dickinson: "It was chiefly in their treatises that the law of na-
ture and of nations received an authoritative exposition.""'
This reliance did not mean that the continental publicists were
infallible. Their treatises on the law of nations were considered
precedents in much the same way that Blackstone regarded judi-
cial decisions as precedents expounding the common law-they
were strong evidence of what the law is. As Jefferson stated in an
opinion to Washington:
Those who write treatises of natural law, can only declare what their
own moral sense and reason dictate in the several cases they state.
Such of them as happen to have feelings and a reason coincident with
those of the wise and honest part of mankind, are respected and
quoted as witnesses of what is morally right or wrong in particular
cases. Grotius, Puffendorf, Wolf, and Vattel are of this number.
Where they agree their authority is strong: but where they differ, and
they often differ, we must appeal to our own feelings and reason to
decide between them.' 17
Or, as Jefferson told Genet, the eminent writers on the law of na-
tions were not incontrovertible, but when they agreed, the burden
was on those who disagreed to provide sounder reasons."'
114. Id. at 363-64.
115. Henry J. Bourguignon, Incorporation of the Law of Nations during the American
Revolution: The Case of the San Antonio, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 270, 294 (1977).
116. Dickinson, Changing Concepts, supra note 8, at 259.
117. Opinion on the Treaties with France (Apr. 28, 1793), in 25 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 608, 613.
118. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond Charles Genet (July 16, 1793), in 26 THE
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B. The Influence of Vattel
Emmerich de Vattel was by far the most influential of the con-
tinental publicists. The impact of his treatise in Europe and the
United States was extraordinary: "Vattel's treatise on the law of
nations was quoted by judicial tribunals, in speeches before legis-
lative assemblies, and in the decrees and correspondence of execu-
tive officials. It was the manual of the student, the reference work
of the statesman, and the text from which the political philoso-
pher drew inspiration."119
The Law of Nations was published in 1758 and translated into
English in London within two years.' It quickly made its way
across the Atlantic;12 1 and, from the beginning of the United States
through well after the founding period, Vattel was the pre-
eminent authority on the law of nations.'2 2 His treatise was con-
sidered authoritative by the bar and the courts, as is evidenced by
it being cited by counsel or the court in about fifty reported deci-
sions of state and federal courts (including the United States Su-
preme Court) between 1780 and 1800"'-which almost certainly
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 510, 512.
119. Charles G. Fenwick, The Authority of Vattel, 7 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 395, 395 (1913).
120. Jesse S. Reeves, The Influence of the Law of Nature upon International Law in the
United States, 3 AM. J. INT'L L. 547, 550 (1909).
121. When Benjamin Franklin received three copies of the book from a Dutch friend in
1775, he responded memorably that "[ilt came to us in good season, when the circumstanc-
es of a rising state make it necessary frequently to consult the law of nations . . . [and] has
been continually in the hands of the members of our Congress, now sitting. . . ." Letter
from Benjamin Franklin to Charles William Frederic Dumas (Dec. 9, 1775), in 2 LEITERS
OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 465 (Paul H. Smith et al. eds., 1977).
122. RUDDY, supra note 90, at 281-310; Adler, supra note 3, at 137-38; see also, e.g.,
U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 462 n. 12 (1978) ('The interna-
tional jurist most widely cited in the first 50 years after the Revolution was Emmerich de
Vattel." (citations omitted)); GERHERD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 44 (2d ed. 1970)
("[N]o single writer has exercised as much direct and lasting influence on the men engaged
in the conduct of international affairs in the legal sphere, at least, until very modern times,
as did Vattel."); PETER ONUF & NICHOLAS ONUF, FEDERAL UNION, MODERN WORLD 11
(1993) (noting that The Law of Nations "was unrivaled among such treatises in its influ-
ence on the American founders"); Dickinson, Changing Concepts, supra note 8, at 250
("[T]here is probably no one of the classical treatises which has been more widely read or
more frequently cited the world over. It was only with the triumph of the positivist or his-
torical conception of the law of nations in the 19th century that Vattel's influence waned.").
Between 1796 and 1872, eighteen translations, or reprints of translations, of this treatise
were published in the United States. RUDDY, supra note 90, at 283.
123. Grotius is cited in twenty reported cases, Pufendorf in seventeen, and Bynkershoek
in twelve during this period. A listing of these citations is on file with the author and with
the Temple University Law Library. In a much earlier survey for the period of 1789-1820,
Edwin D. Dickinson, who did not have the benefit of computer-based research, found nine-
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understates the record of its authority inasmuch as modern law
reports did not exist during this era.124
Significantly for the thesis of this article, Hamilton and Jeffer-
son each considered Vattel as authoritative and inspirational. Ac-
cording to Forrest McDonald, Vattel was one of the three philoso-
phers/statesmen who had the greatest effect on Hamilton's think-
ing.125 In his opinions to Washington, Hamilton called Vattel "per-
haps the most accurate and approved of the writers on the laws of
Nations,"126 and "the most systematic of the writers on the laws of
nations.""m Jefferson helped create the first chair in natural law at
the College of William & Mary in 1780 (to be held by his teacher,
George Wythe), and the prescribed text was Vattel's treatise.12 In
an opinion to Washington, Jefferson stated: "We may appeal too to
Vattel himself, in those parts of his book where he cannot be mis-
understood, and to his known character, as one of the most zeal-
ous and constant advocates for the preservation of good faith in all
our dealings."'29 Similarly, Jefferson would tell Genet: "But we will
not assume the exclusive right of saying what the law and usage
is. Let us appeal to enlightened and disinterested Judges. None is
more so than Vattel."30
ty-two citations to Vattel, as compared to sixteen to Grotius, nine to Pufendorf, and twenty-
five to Bynkershoek. Dickinson, Changing Concepts, supra note 8, at 259 n.132, reprinted
in ARTHUR NAUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 162 (rev. ed. 1962).
124. The first printed American law report, which was a selective retrospective compila-
tion, was EPHRAIM KIRBY, REPORTS OF CASES ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE
STATE OF CONNECTICUT, FROM THE YEAR 1785, TO MAY, 1788 (Dennis & Co., Inc. 1952)
(1898). The first modern law report-"one in which the decisions of a court, and the reasons
for the decisions, are published on a regular and timely basis, so as to be generally availa-
ble to all courts, the legal profession, and the public"-was the United States Reports, pub-
lished in 1804 by the reporter William Cranch. WILFRED J. RITZ, REWRITING THE HISTORY
OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789: EXPOSING MYTHS, CHALLENGING PREMISES, AND USING
NEW EVIDENCE 46-47 (Wythe Holt & L. H. LaRue eds., 1990). Of the original thirteen
states, none had modern law reports before 1804 and only five by 1810. See id. at 47.
125. See FORREST MCDONALD, NovUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF
THE CONSTITUTION 188 (1985).
126. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George Washington (Sept. 15, 1790), in 7 THE
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 67, at 36, 40.
127. Letter from Alexander Hamilton and Henry Knox to George Washington (May 2,
1793), in 14 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 67, at 367, 382.
128. See Ira Bernard Dworkin, America's First Law School: The College of William and
Mary, 37 A.B.A. J. 348, 348 (1951); Reeves, supra note 120, at 551. It was also the principal
text in international law at Dartmouth, Yale, Harvard, Columbia, Amherst, and Williams.
Adler, supra note 3, at 138; Reeves, supra note 120, at 551.
129. Opinion on the Treaties with France (Apr. 28, 1793), in 25 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 608, 615.
130. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond Charles Genet (June 17, 1793), in 26
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Vattel recognized that a consistent practice of international re-
lations could lead to a new doctrine that was binding on the na-
tions that consent to it, provided that it did not violate principles
of natural law."' But a customary law of nations based on practice
and consent was insignificant to The Law of Nations."' With very
few exceptions-and none that relate to issues in the Neutrality
Crisis-the doctrines in his treatise derived from natural law and
were obligatory for all nations.13
The Law of Nations was of seminal importance to the leaders of
the American Revolution because it animated pre-revolutionary
thought that is at the core of the Declaration of Independence.'34
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 297, 299.
131. VATTEL, supra note 25, Introduction, bk. I, §§ 25-26, at 8-9 (stating that a custom
or usage that was generally established among "civilized countries" becomes binding on all
nations that consent to it). "But if there be anything unjust or unlawful in such a custom, it
is of no force, ... since there can be neither obligation nor authorization to violate the Law
of Nature." Id. Introduction, bk. I, § 26, at 9. To the same effect, see Opinion on the Trea-
ties with France (Apr. 28, 1793), in 25 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10,
at 608, 609; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond Charles Genet (July 24, 1793), in 26
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10 at 557, 557-58.
132. VATTEL, supra note 25, Preface, at 11a (noting that the treatise expounds manda-
tory laws, while "[d]etails of the different treaties and customs of Nations belong rather to
history than to a systematic treatise on the Law of Nations").
133. Id. bk. III, § 192, at 306 ("In this work we are laying down the natural principles of
the Law of Nations; we deduce them from nature itself; and what we call the voluntary
Law of Nations consists in the rules of conduct, of external law, to which the natural law
obliges Nations to consent; so that we rightly presume their consent, without seeking any
record of it; for even if they had not given their consent, the Law of Nature supplies it, and
gives it for them. Nations are not free in this matter to consent or not; the Nation which
would refuse to consent would violate the common rights of all Nations."); see William S.
Dodge, Withdrawing from Customary International Law: Some Lessons from History, 120
YALE L.J. ONLINE 169,171-75 (2010).
One reason for Vattel's general popularity was his accessibility. He wrote in French
(then the international language of law and diplomacy), with clear and affecting prose, and
he sometimes used contemporary examples of European practice to illustrate or support
his doctrines. Stbphane Beaulac, Emer de Vattel and the Externalization of Sovereignty, 5
J. HIST. INT'L L. 237, 287-90 (2003). Despite his own denials, a debate exists on the extent
to which Vattel introduced an element of legal positivism into the law of nations by placing
some reliance on contemporary practice. VATTEL, supra note 25, Preface, at 13a; see RUDDY,
supra note 90, at 76; Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 20,
27 (1948); Reeves, supra note 120, at 550. Perhaps the best analysis is by Edwin D. Dickin-
son, Changing Concepts, supra note 8, at 249-50 (noting that positivism was of "relatively
little importance" to Vattel and Wolff, from whom Vattel borrowed many ideas). "While
they [Vattel and Wolff] gave reluctant recognition to positive elements in the law of na-
tions, which the school of the naturalists had consistently refused to do, their system was
constructed fundamentally upon concepts of the state of nature and natural law." Id. at
250.
134. No other treatise on international law came close to being as widely read or as
heavily relied upon by the Revolution's leaders. See DAVID ARMITAGE, THE DECLARATION
OF INDEPENDENCE: A GLOBAL HISTORY 38-4 (2007).
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Vattel posited the legitimacy of a perpetual confederated republic
consisting of a number of states that retained their internal sov-
ereignty.' This legitimacy was used with effect as an antidote to
Blackstone's dogma that there could be only one sovereign-
Parliament-in the British empire.'3 6 Moreover, every nation, ac-
cording to Vattel, has the sovereign right to determine its own
form of government, and the aim of government is to maximize
the happiness of its citizens and "to secure to each the peaceful
enjoyment of his property and a sure means of obtaining jus-
tice."' He also insisted, contrary to Blackstone, that "there can be
no such thing as a fully absolute sovereign."' The Prince is
"strictly bound" to uphold the nation's constitution and fundamen-
tal laws; if he does not, the nation is not bound to obey him and
may resist him as a usurper-and in extreme cases, with force.'
Vattel's doctrines also influenced the principles under which
American government was established. His proposition that a
multiplicity of sovereign states could be perpetually bound togeth-
er in a confederated republic was instrumental to early American
ideas about federalism.O And Vattel was a constitutionalist. He
maintained that the constitution is itself the fundamental law;
thus, the legislature does not have the authority to enact laws
that violate the constitution. 4 1
Finally, Vattel was an advocate of weak states in international
relations. A central theorem of The Law of Nations is that all
states are equal and have the same rights and obligations:
Since men are by nature equal, and their individual rights and obli-
gations the same, as coming equally from nature, Nations, which are
composed of men and may be regarded as so many free persons living
together in a state of nature, are by nature equal and hold from na-
ture the same obligations and the same rights. Strength or weakness,
in this case, counts for nothing. A dwarf is as much a man as a giant
is; a small Republic is no less a sovereign State than the most power-
ful Kingdom.142
135. See VATTEL, supra note 25, bk. I, § 10, at 12.
136. See ALISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 79-
80(2010).
137. VATTEL, supra note 25, bk. I, §§ 15, 31, at 13, 18.
138. Id. § 51, at 24.
139. Id. §§ 46-49, 51, 53-54, at 22-23, 25-26.
140. See LACROIX, supra note 136, at 124-26; ONUF & ONUF, supra note 122, at 5-7.
141. VATTEL, supra note 25, bk. I, § 27, 34, at 17, 19.
142. Id. Introduction, § 18, at 7.
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As a corollary, each nation has an equal right to independently
establish its own form of government without outside interfer-
ence.143 No nation may question how another nation is ruled, nor
judge its internal conduct, nor force it to follow a wiser and more
just course.1"
In light of the natural law jurisprudence of the continental pub-
licists and the doctrines of internal and external sovereign rights
and moral values that they expounded, it is not surprising that
the founding generation would look to them-and especially to
Vattel-as authoritative guides for determining the content of the
law of nations.
Many changes have occurred since the founding. One of the
most important changes is that the founding generation thought
differently about law and about the sources of law. The influence
of Vattel and the other naturalist publicists faded almost to the
point of obscurity by the end of the nineteenth century,"' but their
143. Id. bk. I, § 31, at 18.
144. Id. bk. II, §§ 54-55, at 131.
145. When international law was captured by legal positivism's emphasis on practice
and consent, the British and American courts continued to hold that international law is
part of the law of the land but repudiated reliance on the natural law doctrines of the con-
tinental publicists. See West Rand Cent. Gold Mining Co. v. The King, [1905] 2 K.B. 391,
407-08 ("But the expressions used by Lord Mansfield ... ought not to be construed so as to
include as part of the law of England opinions of text-writers upon a question as to which
there is no evidence that Great Britain has ever assented.. ); The Paquete Habana, 175
U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("International law is part of our law. . . [W]here there is no treaty,
and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the
customs and usages of civilized nations; and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and
commentators, who by years of labor, research and experience, have made themselves pecu-
liarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they treat. Such works are resorted to by
judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought
to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is." (emphasis added) (citing Hil-
ton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64, 214-15 (1895))).
The death sentence on the naturalists was pronounced by the then-leading authority on
international law: "The Law of Nature supplied the crutches with whose help history has
taught mankind to walk out of the institutions of the Middle Ages into those of modern
times. ... We know nowadays that a Law of Nature does not exist.... Only a positive Law
of Nations can be a branch of the science of law." OPPENHEIM, supra note 12, at 80, 92. Yet,
although both naturalists and positivists insisted that an airtight categorical wall existed
between these two schools of thought, they necessarily overlap to some extent. The natural-
ists were certainly cognizant of state practice and took that into account in developing their
doctrines. This awareness was particularly true of Vattel, who had the greatest influence
on the founding generation. See supra notes 110-12, 124-29 and accompanying text. And,
at least for countries that adhere to the rule of law and respect for human rights, underly-
ing values of justice will necessarily affect the use of positivism. Yet, despite this inevitable
overlap, the difference between naturalism and positivism is at least a huge matter of de-
gree, if not of kind, because these two forms of jurisprudence represent different ways of
thinking about the law that begin with different premises and frequently lead to different
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authoritativeness to the founding generation is critical in as-
sessing Washington's actions as executing duties under the law of
nations and the Take Care Clause. And this influence provides a
foundation for the next question to be examined-whether the
administration's public declarations that its decisions were obliga-
tory under the law of nations were consistent with its internal de-
liberations.
V. CABINET DELIBERATIONS
In its letter to the French government requesting Genet's recall,
the administration's first charge was as follows:
Mr: Genet asserts his right of arming in our ports, and of enlisting
our citizens, and that we have no right to restrain him or punish
them. Examining this question under the law of nations, founded on
the general sense and usage of mankind, we have produced proofs,
from the most enlightened and approved writers on the subject, that
a neutral nation must, in all things relating to the war, observe an
exact impartiality towards the parties; that favors to one to the prej-
udice of the other would import a fraudulent neutrality, of which no
nation would be the dupe; .. . that if the United States have a right to
refuse the permission to arm vessels and raise men within their ports
and territories, they are bound by the laws of neutrality to exercise
146
that right, and to prohibit such armaments and enlistments.
Genet was incredulous that the Washington administration was
honestly attempting to follow the law of nations as expounded by
the continental publicists. After being lectured by Jefferson about
strict neutrality, with lengthy quotations from Vattel,147 Genet ex-
ploded: "You oppose my complaints, to my just reclamations ...
[by] bring[ing] forward the aphorisms of Vattel, to justify or ex-
cuse infractions committed on positive treaties.""' Jefferson did
not back down and continued to invoke the authority of Vattel and
conclusions.
146. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gouverneur Morris (Aug. 16, 1793), in 26 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 697, 699. Note how this language ("exact
impartiality" and "favors to one to the prejudice of the other would import a fraudulent
neutrality, of which no nation would be the dupe") is borrowed from Vattel ("strictly impar-
tial" and "favors [to] one to the prejudice of the other ... would be a hypocritical neutrality,
of which no State would consent to be the dupe"). VATTEL, supra note 25, bk. III, § 104, at
268.
147. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond Charles Genet (June 17, 1793), in 26
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 297, 297-300.
148. Letter from Edmond Charles Genet to Thomas Jefferson (June 22, 1793), in 26
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 339, 339.
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the other continental publicists to Genet and the French govern-
ment.14 ' Genet responded with contempt: "I do not recollect what
the worm eating writings of Grotius, Puffendorf and Vattel
say.... I thank God I have forgot what those hired jurisprudents
have written on the rights of nations, at a period when they were
all enchained."50
Could the administration's insistence that it was following the
continental publicists' strict neutrality doctrines as a matter of
legal principle have been an elaborate charade? That question can
be tested by examining the administration's internal deliberations
and decisions during the period that began with the Cabinet meet-
ing of April 19, 1793, when the administration first started to de-
velop its neutrality policies, through August 4, 1793, when Wash-
ington issued the Rules on Neutrality.
A. The Validity of the French Treaties
At its April 19, 1793 meeting, the Cabinet was to consider thir-
teen questions whose answers would shape American policy as a
neutral in the war between France and Great Britain."' The Cab-
inet decided that the President should issue what became known
as the Neutrality Proclamation and that Washington should re-
ceive Genet, the new minister from France.' Each of these deci-
sions was unanimous and will be explored below.' But the criti-
cal issue for the administration, that split the Cabinet, was the
third question-whether Genet should be received with or without
149. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond Charles Genet (July 16, 1793), in 26 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 510, 512; Letter from Thomas Jefferson
to Governeur Morris (Aug. 16, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note
10, at 697, 699; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond Charles Genet (Nov. 15-22,
1793), in 27 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 378, 379. See also Jef-
ferson's complaint to Madison that Genet was ignorant and disdainful of Vattel and other
continental publicists, Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 3, 1793), in
26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 606, 606.
150. Letter from Edmond Charles Genet to Thomas Jefferson (Oct 27. 1793), in 27 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 272, 272-73.
151. Letter from George Washington to the Cabinet (Apr. 18, 1793), in 25 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 568, 568-69.
152. Cabinet Opinion on Washington's Questions on Neutrality and the Alliance with
France (Apr. 19, 1793), in 25 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 570,
570.
153. Id.; see discussion infra Part VI A-C. (discussing Jefferson's initial opposition to
issuing the proclamation and Hamilton's initial opposition to receiving Genet).
410 [Vol. 46:373
EXECUTIVE POWER
qualification. 5 4 Hamilton insisted on a qualification-that the
President should declare that the treaties with France were not
binding on the United States."' Hamilton read a long prepared
statement that was constructed around a passage from Vattel,
which, Hamilton maintained, made the French treaties either
void or suspended.'56 Jefferson argued that the treaties were still
binding.' Then it was Randolph's turn, and he brought the meet-
ing to an abrupt end.'"' The Attorney General said that he had
thought that the treaties were still legally binding but that he
would change his position if Hamilton was correct about Vattel. '59
However, no one had thought to bring The Law of Nations to the
Cabinet, so a frustrated President adjourned the meeting and di-
rected the members to submit written opinions.'
The written opinions of Hamilton, Jefferson, and Randolph are
juridical compositions that read like modern briefs to the Supreme
Court, except that they were written to persuade not a group of
judges but one person, the President."' Each Cabinet member
agreed that the validity of treaties, which are contracts between
nations, is determined by the law of nations, just as the validity of
contracts between individuals is determined by the common law.'
154. See Editor's Note to Cabinet Opinion on Washington's Questions on Neutrality and
the Alliance with France (Apr. 19, 1793), in 25 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra
note 10, at 570, 571.
155. Letter from Alexander Hamilton and Henry Knox to George Washington (May 2,
1793), in 14 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 67, at 367, 368.
156. Notes on Washington's Questions on Neutrality and the Alliance with France (May
6, 1793), in 25 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 665, 666.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See id.
161. These opinions were private official opinions, which Washington would not have
wanted to be made public because they would have revealed a split in his administration.
162. See THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 393-94 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003). Jay
denied the possibility of a treaty being infected by the corruption of the President and two-
thirds of the Senate, but added: "[I1n such a case, if it should ever happen, the treaty so
obtained from us would, like all other fraudulent contracts, be null and void by the laws of
nations." Id.
No one asserted that the law of nations was superior to positive law as contained in a
federal treaty or statute. The approach that was used later became known as the Charm-
ing Betsy rule, that "an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of
nations if any other possible construction remains, and consequently can never be con-
strued to violate neutral rights, or to affect neutral commerce, further than is warranted by
the law of nations as understood in this country." Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6
U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
2012]1 411
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
In his lengthy written opinion to Washington,163 Hamilton stated
the dispositive issue as follows:
Are the United States bound, by the principles of the laws of na-
tions, to consider the Treaties heretofore made with France, as in
present force and operation between them and the actual Governing
powers of the French Nation? or may they elect to consider their op-
eration as suspended, reserving also the right to judge finally, wheth-
er any such changes have happened in the political affairs of France
as may justify a renunciation of those Treaties? 64
Hamilton acknowledged that the treaties with France were real
treaties (i.e., treaties with the French nation and not just personal
to Louis XVI), that France had the right to change its government,
and that real treaties ordinarily remained binding following
changes in government.'65 But Hamilton seized on a passage in
Vattel and argued that an exception applied to this general doc-
trine.16 ' The Vattel passage states:
If the Nation has formally deposed its King, if the people of a Repub-
lic have driven out their public officers and set themselves at liberty,
or if they have expressly or impliedly acknowledged the authority of
an usurper, to oppose these domestic arrangements, or to dispute
their justice or validity, would be to interfere in the government of
the Nation and to do it an injury .... The sovereign remains the ally
of the State in spite of the changes which have taken place within it.
However, if these such changes are such as to render the alliance use-
less, dangerous, or disagreeable to him, he is at liberty to disclaim it;
for he can say with good reason that he would not have entered into
an alliance with that Nation if it had been under its present form of
government.167
Hamilton then argued that the present government of France was
unstable and that the form of its permanent government was un-
certain.'"' It might be a republic but also could be a despotism
163. See Letter from Alexander Hamilton and Henry Knox to George Washington (May
2, 1793), in 14 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 67, at 367, 367-96 (Knox,
the Secretary of War, almost invariably followed Hamilton); Letter from Alexander Hamil-
ton to George Washington (May 2, 1793), in 14 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON,
supra note 67, at 398, 398-408.
164. Letter from Alexander Hamilton and Henry Knox to George Washington (May 2,
1793), in 14 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 67, at 367, 371-72.
165. Id. at 372-74, 372 nn.10-11.
166. Id. at 382-83.
167. VATTEL, supra note 25, bk. II, § 197, at 175 (emphasis added). Fenwick's transla-
tion uses the word "unsatisfactory" instead of "disagreeable." I use the latter word to be
consistent with Hamilton, Jefferson, and Randolph and maintain this consistency in other
parts of this article.
168. Letter from Alexander Hamilton and Henry Knox to George Washington (May 2,
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(which, as Hamilton feared, it became), in which case an alliance
with France would be highly "disagreeable.""' The prudent course
would be to declare the treaties in suspense until a permanent
government emerged in France."'
Hamilton also argued that the treaties were dangerous to the
United States. Recognizing their continued validity compromised
American neutrality because the treaties contained preferences
for France and restrictions on Great Britain."' Most significantly,
the guarantee of the French West Indies in the Treaty of Alliance
could lead the United States into a shooting war with Great Brit-
ain.'72 Given American military weakness, the United States could
not effectively protect those West Indies possessions in any way;
honoring the guarantee would therefore plunge the United States
into a catastrophic and useless war."' Moreover, if the United
States refused to honor the guarantee, France could regard that
violation of the treaty as a causus belli."' Again, the prudent
course was to follow Vattel and disclaim the alliance before the
guarantee was invoked."' Finally, relying on statements of the
continental publicists Burlamaqui, Barbeyrac, and Pufendorf,
Hamilton argued that France was conducting an offensive war
and that the United States was not bound to honor the guarantee
because it was in a "defensive" alliance. 6
1793), in THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 67, at 367, 385.
169. Id., at 377-78, 383 (explaining that two nations may enter into a treaty, but a
change of the government of one of them into a despotism may destroy the inducement and
main link of common interest).
170. Id. at 367, 385.
171. Id. at 367, 387, 387 n.22, 391 (explaining that the treaty's military stipulations
would force departure from America's neutrality in "the quarrels of Europe").
172. Treaty of Alliance, supra note 22, at art. XI, 8 Stat. at 10; Letter from Alexander
Hamilton and Henry Knox to George Washington (May 2, 1793), in 14 THE PAPERS OF AL-
EXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 67, at 391, 391-92 (explaining that America's status as a
French ally would authorize the powers at war with France to treat it as an enemy).
173. Letter from Alexander Hamilton and Henry Knox to George Washington (May 2,
1793), in 14 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 67, at 367, 387, 387-88 n.22
(explaining that war would prove an immeasurable calamity for the United States).
174. Id. at 387-91.
175. Id. at 393.
176. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George Washington (May 2, 1793), in 14 HAM-
ILTON PAPERS, supra note 67, at 398, 398-99. Vattel also stated that a nation was not
bound to honor a preexisting defensive alliance when the ally who was attacked had start-
ed an unjust war, but he significantly qualified this principle. See VA'rEL, supra note 25,
bk. III, §§ 86, 87, at 262-63. See Randolph's response, infra notes 188-93 and accompany-
ing text.
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In his own lengthy response, 17 Jefferson tried to disentangle
the reception of France's foreign minister from the validity of the
treaties:
I deny that the reception of a minister has anything to do with the
treaties. There is not a word, in either of them, about sending minis-
ters. This has been done between us under the common usage of na-
tions and can have no effect either to continue or annul the trea-
ties.'
But most of Jefferson's opinion dealt with the continuing validi-
ty of the treaties. He agreed with Hamilton that the validity of the
French treaties was determined by the law of nations:
The Law of Nations, by which this question is to be determined, is
composed of three branches. 1. the Moral law of our nature. 2. the
Usages of nations. 3. their special Conventions. The first of these only
concerns this question, that is to say the Moral law to which Man has
been subjected by his creator, and of which his feelings, or Conscience
as it is sometimes called, are the evidence with which his creator has
furnished him... Compacts then between nation and nation are ob-
ligatory on them by the same moral law which obliges individuals to
observe their compacts. There are circumstances however which
sometimes excuse the non-performance of contracts between man and
man: so are there also between nation and nation. When perfor-
mance, for instance, becomes impossible, non-performance is not im-
moral. So if performance becomes self-destructive to the party, the
law of self-preservation overrules the laws of obligation to others. 7 9
Jefferson adamantly denied that a treaty could be renounced be-
cause a nation considered it useless or disagreeable, and he main-
tained that if the ground were danger, it must be grave and im-
minent."' He then argued that the treaties did not present such
danger, reasoning that the preferences to France and the re-
straints on Britain in the Treaty of Amity and Commerce could be
minimized by interpreting the provisions according to strict neu-
trality."8 ' As for the guarantee in the Treaty of Alliance, that dan-
ger was speculative because it was contingent on a number of un-
177. Opinion on the Treaties with France (Apr. 28, 1793), in 25 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 608-18. Jefferson's written opinion was actually submitted
before Hamilton's, but Jefferson drafted it as a response to Hamilton, because he knew the
latter's argument from the Cabinet presentation.
178. Id. at 612.
179. Id. at 609.
180. Id. at 608-09 (relying on VATTEL, supra note 25, bk. III, § 92, at 263) ("[Wle are
speaking here of an imminent danger and one which threatens the very life of the State.").
181. Id. at 610-13.
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predictable events, the most notable of which was whether France
would actually invoke it.18 2
Jefferson then quoted at length from Grotius, Pufendorf, and
Wolff, all of whom held that treaties remain binding despite
changes of government unless the preservation of a particular
form of government was the object of the treaty."' He then ad-
dressed the passage from Vattel, arguing first that Hamilton's
construction contradicted Vattel's entire approach to honoring
treaties-the obligatory nature of which was considered sacred,
and the breach of which was a grievous violation of the law of na-
tions.' And this passage did not say that a nation could disclaim
a treaty because a change of government made it useless, disa-
greeable, or dangerous. The explanatory end of the passage was
critical. It meant that: "For the party may say with truth that it
would not have allied itself with this nation, if it had been under
the present form of it's [sic] government."' That conclusion clear-
ly was not the case with the Revolutionary War treaties. Fighting
for its very existence, the United States would have entered into
those treaties with France regardless of its form of government.
As for the suggestion that it would be "disagreeable" for the Unit-
182. Id. at 610-11. Jefferson's hope/prediction that France would not invoke the guar-
antee in order to preserve American neutrality (which was expected to be "benevolent" in
France's favor) proved correct. However, the administration did not then know France's
position on the guarantee, and Jefferson offered the following alternatives short of the use
of American military force in the event that France invoked it:
If [France] can save them themselves, have they a right to call on us?
Are we obliged to go to war at once, without trying peaceable negotiations
with their enemy?
If all these questions be against us, there are still others behind.
Are we in a condition to go to war?
Can we be expected to begin before we are in condition?
Will the islands be lost if we do not save them?
Have we the means of saving them?
If we cannot save them, are we bound to go to war for a desperate object?
Will not a 10. years forbearance in us to call them into the guarantee of our
posts [the forebearance being that the United States did not invoke its guar-
antee for France to help evict Britain from the western posts, which it held in
violation of the Treaty of Peace], entitle us to some indulgence?
Many, if not most of these questions offer grounds of doubt whether the clause
of guarantee will draw us into the war. Consequently if this be the danger ap-
prehended, it is not yet certain enough to authorize us in sound morality to
declare, at this moment, the treaties null.
Id. at 611 (footnotes omitted).
183. Id. at 613-15.
184. Id. at 615-17 (citing VATTEL, supra note 25, at bk. II, §§ 219-20, at 188).
185. Id. at 617 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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ed States to ally itself with a despotic government, that exactly
described France's absolute monarchy in 1778."' Jefferson con-
cluded "[t]hat the treaties are still binding, notwithstanding the
change of government in France.""'
The decisive opinion was delivered by the Attorney General, a
member of the Cabinet who has been overshadowed historically
by his colleagues but who had great influence with Washington."'
Quoting extensively from Vattel, Randolph first concluded that
the United States was legally required to receive Genet without
qualification."' Randolph's arguments on the treaties were similar
to Jefferson's (and Randolph quoted large portions of Vattel's
chapter on the interpretation and binding nature of treaties), with
two additions. First, Randolph did not have a problem with the
assertion that the treaties with France compromised United
States neutrality, because he adopted Vattel's doctrine that a na-
tion may comply with the obligations of preexisting treaties with-
out forfeiting its neutrality."'o Nor was Randolph impressed with
the argument that the "defensive" alliance had been voided by
French aggression, because it was impossible for any American
objectively to determine which country was to blame for the war."'
The Attorney General thereupon concluded that "Mr. Genest [sic]
ought to be received absolutely, and without qualifications," and
that "the U.S. are bound to admit them [the treaties] to be appli-
cable to the present situation of the parties."'92 Randolph's opinion
was delivered to Washington on May 6, 1793, and the President
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Letter from Edmund Randolph to George Washington (May 6, 1793), in 12 THE
PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 39, at 534, 534-48. On Jefferson's resentment
of Randolph's influence, see, for example, Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison
(May 13, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 25-26; Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 11, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 651, 653.
189. Letter from Edmund Randolph to George Washington (May 6, 1793), in 12 THE
PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 39, at 534, 537-38.
190. Id. at 538-42.
191. Id. at 545. Here, Randolph was again following Vattel. Although Vattel had stated
that a defensive alliance was not binding on behalf of an ally who conducted an unjust war,
he emphasized, consistently with other continental publicists, that "this principle must not
be so interpreted as to reduce treaties of alliance to mere empty formalities. The implied
reservation only holds where the war is evidently unjust; otherwise a pretext could always
be found for invalidating treaties." VAT'TEL, supra note 25, bk. III, §§ 86-87, at 262-63.
192. Letter from Edmund Randolph to George Washington (May 6, 1793), in 12 The
PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 39, at 534, 546-47.
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stated the same day that the treaties with France were still legal-
ly in force.'
B. The Referral to the Supreme Court
The administration dealt with allegations of law of nations vio-
lations by the belligerents on an ad hoc basis. This procedure was
inefficient, time consuming, and logistically difficult. The admin-
istration needed a set of rules governing the belligerents that
would be enforced by executive officials and judges throughout the
country. With regular (and threatening) protests coming from the
British and French ministers, Washington decided to refer the
disputed issues to the Supreme Court for legal determinations.'94
Twenty-nine questions were drafted-the first nine of which re-
quested interpretations of the treaties with France (all assumed
that the treaties were still in effect), and the remainder sought
rulings on the obligations of the United States under the law of
nations.' The Cabinet had yet to resolve some of these issues, but
others were major issues that had already been decided by the
administration and declared publicly to the belligerents."' Jeffer-
son advised the Court:
These questions depend for their solution on the construction of our
treaties, on the laws of nature and nations, and on the laws of the
land; and are often presented under circumstances which do not give
193. See BEMIS, DIPLOMATIC HISTORY, supra note 43, at 96; ELKINS & MCKITRICK, su-
pra note 16, at 340; HERRING, supra note 86, at 70, see also Notes on Washington's Ques-
tions on Neutrality and the Alliance with France (May 6, 1793), in 25 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 665, 665-66 (noting that Washington said that he
had never doubted the continuing validity of the treaties but wanted to give each member
of the Cabinet an opportunity for argument).
194. Cabinet Opinion on Consulting the Supreme Court (July 12, 1793), in 26 THE PA-
PERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 484, 484-85. The vote was unanimous. See
id. (containing signatures of Cabinet members). Perhaps because he lost the legal argu-
ment on the validity of the French treaties, Hamilton had initially objected to referring
such issues to the courts, because "[t]he whole is an affair between the Governments of the
parties concerned-to be settled by reasons of state, not rules of law." Letter from Alexan.
der Hamilton to George Washington (May 15, 1793), in 14 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON, supra note 67, at 451, 459.
195. Questions for the Supreme Court (July 18, 1793), reprinted in 26 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 534, 534-36.
196. The latter category included whether France could arm privateers in U.S. ports,
recruit Americans to serve in the French military, erect consular courts to condemn prizes
and/or sell their prizes in the United States; whether British vessels (except privateers)
could use U.S. ports, including for purposes of trade; and whether the United States, in
default of the captor nation, was obligated to make restitution if a prize was captured with.
in U.S. territorial waters or by a privateer outfitted in a U.S. port. See supra note 10.
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a cognisance of them to the tribunals of the country. Yet their deci-
sion is so little analogous to the ordinary functions of the Executive,
as to occasion much embarrassment and difficulty to them. 9 7
The Supreme Court's initial response was to stall"' and then to
decline to answer on the ground that it could not give advisory
opinions.19
The Supreme Court's refusal to issue a legal opinion at the re-
quest of the President has been an interesting subject of scholar-
ship.200 But one also should examine why Washington would make
such a request to the Supreme Court. If Washington believed that
he was exercising discretionary executive power, the referral to
the Supreme Court seems incomprehensible. It would be ceding
control over foreign affairs to the branch of government that was
least suited to perform that function. Moreover, the referral to the
Court was not risk-free. The Supreme Court could have given a
legal opinion with "wrong" answers-including to major questions
that the administration had already decided and implemented.
Such an outcome might seem unlikely given the political disrup-
tion (and danger) that this decision could cause and the close rela-
tionship between Washington and Chief Justice John Jay. Yet no
guarantee was in place of what the full Court would do. Thus far,
the lower courts had shown a distinct lack of cooperation with
administration policy.2 01 The administration wanted the district
courts, acting as admiralty courts, to assume jurisdiction over dis-
puted captures and to order restitution when prizes were seized
illegally.202 But several district court judges held that, under the
law of nations, they had no jurisdiction over foreign captures.203
197. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Justices of the Supreme Court (July 18, 1793),
in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 520, 520.
198. See Letter from the Justices of the Supreme Court to George Washington (July 20,
1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 543, 543-44.
199. See Editor's Note to Draft of Questions to Be Submitted to Justices of the Supreme
Court (July 18, 1793), in 15 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 17, at 111,
111-12 n.1 (detailing the Court's later response on August 8, 1793).
200. E.g., CASTO, SUPREME COURT, supra note 109, at 78-82; JAY, HUMBLE SERVANTS,
supra note 16, 149-70.
201. See CASTO, SUPREME COURT, supra note 109, at 82-84.
202. See id. at 82-83.
203. See, e.g., Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942, 948 (D. Pa. 1793) (No. 9, 895);
Findlay v. The William, 9 F. Cas. 57, 57, 61-62 (D. Pa. 1793) (No. 4,790); Glass v. The
Sloop Betsy (D. Md. 1793), in 6 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, at 304, 324-25 (Maeva Marcus et al. eds., 1998) [hereinaf-
ter THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY], rev'd, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6, 16 (1794). For discussions of
these decisions, see generally CASTO, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 1, at 86-90. For the
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These decisions were overruled by the Supreme Court in the fol-
lowing year, with the Court holding that Congress had vested the
entire admiralty jurisdiction in the district courts, which included
authority over foreign captures and the power to order restitution
for illegally seized prizes, and that the establishment of French
consular courts in the United States was illegal.204 But that deci-
sion was in the future, and no one could predict with certainty
what the Supreme Court would do at that point in time.
Aside from settling the law, a favorable decision by the Su-
preme Court would have produced minimal benefits. It might
have sparked more public support for the administration's poli-
cies, although Henfield's and other cases suggest that the opposi-
tion would not have been impressed by the views of Federalist
judges.205 The notion that an opinion of American judges would
have affected Genet is wishful thinking.20' On the other hand, if
the Court's opinions were adverse to the administration's posi-
tions, Washington would have had little choice but to follow them,
whether legally bound or not, because they had been requested by
the administration with the explanation that the Court had supe-
rior expertise over the issues presented and the United States was
the only party to the case. Throughout his tenure as President,
Washington was exceptionally conscious that his actions would be
precedents for the country's future. Presidential defiance of a rul-
ing by the Supreme Court was not a precedent that George Wash-
ington likely would have set.
It is possible that Washington's referral to the Supreme Court
was an attempt to obtain legal cover for discretionary executive
decisions. But it is more likely that the referral was for the reason
that Washington gave-he wanted definitive legal rulings on the
sake of brevity, subsequent citations to volumes of The Documentary History, edited by
Maeva Marcus omit editor and publication information.
204. Glass, 3 U.S. at 16.
205. See infra notes 280-90, 315-27 and accompanying text.
206. Genet's views were fixed, and judges were not in any event held in high regard in
revolutionary France. The organic laws of the new French Republic provided that each
branch of the government had the authority to decide on the legality of its own acts. See
JOHN BELL, FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 20-21 (1992). The famous 1790 statute that
restructured the judiciary prohibited the courts from interpreting legislation and required
the courts to apply to the legislature for such interpretation. See James Beardsley, Consti-
tutional Review in France, 1975 SUP. CT. REV. 189, 192 (1975) (citing Law of 16-24 Aug.
1790, Title II, III, Art. 10, 12, in J.B. DUVERGIER, COLLECTION COMPLETE DES Lois 310
(1860)).
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duties and scope of his authority under the treaties and the law of
nations.
C. The Rules on Neutrality
Having been rebuffed by the Supreme Court, Washington di-
rected the Cabinet "[t]o fix rules on substantial and impartial
ground, conformably to treaties and the Laws of Nations."20 7 The
Cabinet's rules carefully tracked Vattel's duality between military
and nonmilitary aid in his laws of strict neutrality.2 08 Equipping
vessels for military purposes was generally "deemed unlawful,"
while equipping merchant ships for commercial purposes was
generally "deemed lawful."209 Equipments for merchant ships that
were "of a doubtful nature, as being applicable either to commerce
or war, [were] deemed lawful.""0 Washington approved those rules
only after being "satisfied that they are not repugnant to treaties,
or to the Laws of Nations; and moreover, are the best we can
adopt to maintain Neutrality."2 1'
Although each of the Rules on Neutrality deemed the belliger-
ents' conduct either "lawful" or "unlawful," they did not purport to
be executive legislation. They were executive interpretations of
the laws of neutrality pending definitive judicial decisions.212
Thus, from the time that the Washington administration
learned of France's war with Britain and its allies, through the
issuance of the Rules on Neutrality, its official declarations were
consistent with its private deliberations. Major decisions by the
administration-validating and interpreting the treaties with
France according to principles of strict neutrality, referring dis-
puted legal issues to the Supreme Court, and establishing Rules
207. Letter from George Washington to the Cabinet (Aug. 3, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 611, 611. Washington's directive actually predated
the Court's refusal to grant the advisory opinion, and it seems clear from the chronology
that the Cabinet was working on the rules while seeking the opinion. Jay may have pri-
vately advised Washington that the Supreme Court might not consider it proper to honor
the request. See CASTO, SUPREME COURT, supra note 109, at 79.
208. See Rules on Neutrality (Aug. 3, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON,
supra note 10, at 608, 608-09; supra notes 25-27, 53-64 and accompanying text.
209. Rules on Neutrality (Aug. 3, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, su-
pra note 10, at 608, 608-09.
210. Id. at 608.
211. Letter from George Washington to Thomas Jefferson (Aug. 4, 1793), in 26 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 618, 618.
212. BEMIS, DIPLOMATIC HISTORY, supra note 43, at 98.
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on Neutrality that were conformable to the treaties and the law of
nations-were based on the principle that the Executive was duty-
bound to execute the law of nations.
The following section examines whether the other unilateral ac-
tions of the administration, and its refusal to act on desirable poli-
cy choices, were also consistent with its understanding of the law
of nations as expounded by the continental publicists.
VI. EXECUTING THE LAW OF NATIONS
This section will demonstrate that the administration followed
Vattel to a remarkable extent. This result would not seem possible
if the Washington administration had been guided solely by real
politik, given both the magnitude and unprecedented nature of
the issues that the administration faced and the fact that the law
of nations did not always produce results that the administration
desired. But if the source of the administration's authority was
the law of nations, its consistent reliance on Vattel is readily un-
derstandable. Recall that upon deciding on strict neutrality, the
administration declared to France and Britain that its policies
were determined by the law of nations as expressed by the conti-
nental publicists."' The credibility of subsequent decisions-and
the credibility of the administration itself-would have been seri-
ously undermined if those decisions were inconsistent with the
originally expressed authorities.
This section first considers the unilateral positive decisions of
the administration: recognizing the French revolutionary govern-
ment, receiving and then requesting that its controversial foreign
minister be recalled, issuing the Neutrality Proclamation, and in-
stituting nonstatutory prosecutions against Americans who com-
mitted hostile military actions against Britain. This section next
examines negative decisions by the administration-its refusals to
prohibit the sales of French prizes and to assert diplomatically to
the belligerents that "free ships make free goods"-which would
likely have been decided differently as matters of policy rather
than law.
213. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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A. Recognizing the Revolutionary Governments
In August 1792, Gouverneur Morris reported to Jefferson that
King Louis XVI had been suspended and that a new government
was being formed.2 14 All other foreign ambassadors and ministers
were leaving France and Gouverneur Morris told Jefferson, "if I
stay I shall be alone.""' Morris was concerned for his safety but
also needed instructions on whether the new government would
be recognized by the United States.2 16 Morris was no friend of
France and was notoriously hostile to the French Revolution."
Nonetheless, Morris suggested that American policy should be as
follows:
[I]f the great Majority of the Nation adhere to the new Form [of gov-
ernment] the United States will approve thereof because in the first
Place we have no Right to prescribe to this Country the Government
they shall adopt and next because the Basis of our own Constitution
is the indefeasible Right of the People to establish it.2 18
In a subsequent exchange of correspondence, Morris reported that
he told French officials that he had no authority to deal with them
and was awaiting instructions, which provoked an angry response
from those officials."' Jefferson told Morris that the debt pay-
ments to France were suspended until a new government was
formed,22 o to which Morris reported that the National Convention
was meeting and that the majority of the French people favored a
republic.22 '
On December 27, 1792, Washington told Jefferson that he
wanted to reestablish close relations with France.22 2 Jefferson said
214. See Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Thomas Jefferson (Aug. 1, 1792), in 24 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 275, 276.
215. Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Thomas Jefferson (Aug. 22, 1792), in 24 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 313, 314.
216. See Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Thomas Jefferson (Aug. 16, 1792), in THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 301, 301, 305.
217. DECONDE, supra note 16, at 326, 331-32.
218. Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Thomas Jefferson (Aug. 22, 1792), in 24 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 313, 314.
219. Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Thomas Jefferson (Aug. 30, 1792), in 24 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 331, 331-32.
220. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gouverneur Morris (Oct. 15, 1792), in 24 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 484, 484-85.
221. Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 23, 1792), in 24 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 524, 528-29.
222. Notes of a Conversation with George Washington on French Affairs (Dec. 27,
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that the National Convention had become the legitimate govern-
ing body of France. 223 Three days after receiving Washington's ap-
proval, Jefferson wrote to Morris that-because the National
Convention was assembled with full powers to transact the affairs
of the nation-Morris was to remove the suspension of the debt
payments and consider "the Convention, or the government they
shall have established as the lawful representatives of the nation,
and authorised to act for them."2 4 The United States thus became
the first country to recognize the revolutionary government of
France.2 25
The recognition question arose even more starkly when Louis
XVI was executed and France declared war on Britain and Hol-
land. On March 12, 1793, Jefferson wrote to Morris:
We surely cannot deny to any nation that right whereon our own
government is founded, that every one may govern itself according to
whatever form it pleases, and change these forms at it's own will: and
that it may transact it's business with foreign nations through what-
ever organ it thinks proper, whether king, convention, assembly,
committee, president or any thing else it may chuse. The will of the
nation is the only thing essential to be regarded.22 6
Jefferson restated his previous direction that Morris suspend the
debt payments to France in the interim until a government was
established.2 27 That objective was accomplished when the National
Convention assembled and assumed governmental power.228
1792), in 24 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 793, 793.
223. Id.
224. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gouverneur Morris (Dec. 30, 1792), in 24 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 800, 800.
225. Compare DECONDE, supra note 16, at 191, with 1 EDWARD BAINES, HISTORY OF
THE WARS OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 136, 158 (1817) (discussing Tuscan and Prussian
recognition in 1795 and British refusal of recognition in 1796).
226. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gouverneur Morris (Mar. 12, 1793), in 25 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 367, 367. Jefferson used virtually identi-
cal language explaining the earlier recognition in a letter to Pinckney approved by Wash-
ington. Compare id., with. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Pinckney (Dec. 30,
1792), in 24 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 802, 803. For Washing-
ton's pre-approval, see Letter from George Washington to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 30,
1792), in 24 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 804, 804. Jefferson
drafted a similar letter to Morris, but that letter may not have been sent or received. See
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gouverneur Morris (Nov. 7, 1792), in 25 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 592, 592-93.
227. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gouverneur Morris (Mar. 12, 1793), in 25 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 367, 367-68.
228. Id. at 368.
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The Constitution does not contain any provision that authorizes
the President to recognize a foreign government, and nothing in
the drafting or ratification debates supports such an executive
power.2 In recognizing the French revolutionary governments,
the Washington administration executed the law of nations by fol-
lowing Vattel's doctrine of de facto recognition-if a government is
in "actual possession" of the instruments of national power, it is
entitled to be recognized by other states.230 This doctrine was
based on the principles that each nation has the right to govern
itself as it thinks proper and the right to change its government
pursuant to its own laws or the express or implied will of its peo-
ple,231 that no foreign state may set itself up as the judge of how
another sovereign rules,"' and that a state does not lose its rights
or privileges as a result of changes in its government.23 3 According-
ly, any government (including even the government of a usurper)
that has actual possession of the instruments of power must be
recognized by foreign sovereigns. 234 A state's refusal to recognize a
foreign government because it disapproves of its form of govern-
ment is therefore a violation of the law of nations and may be a
causus belli.3
B. Receiving Genet and Requesting His Recall
The Constitution provides that the President "shall receive
Ambassadors and other public Ministers.""' This clause requires
the President, as head of state, to perform a ministerial duty. It
was not intended or understood as a source of discretionary execu-
229. See Robert J. Reinstein, Recognition: A Case Study in the Original Understanding
of Executive Power, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 801, 860-61 (2011).
230. GOEBEL, supra note 90, at 41; Adler, supra note 3, at 138-39.
231. See VATTEL, supra note 25, bk. I, §§ 66-67, at 30-32.
232. Id. bk. II, §§ 54-55, at 131.
233. Id. bk. I, § 69, at 33-34.
234. See id. bk. IV, § 68, at 365-66.
235. See id. at 366. Prakash and Ramsey assert that Washington assumed discretionary
executive power over recognition, because Congress never tried to tell the President which
nations or governments to recognize. Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 1, at 312-13. This
argument was recently adopted in Zivotofsky v. Secretary of State, 571 F.3d 1227, 1232
(D.C. Cir. 2009), reh'g en banc denied, 610 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub nom,
M.B.Z. ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, _ U.S. -, 131 S. Ct. 2897 (2011). But the Washing-
ton administration did not recognize any nations, and the only new governments it recog-
nized were those of France. The challenge for the United States was to be recognized by the
European community of nations. See Reinstein, supra note 229, at 860.
236. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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tive power.23 The receipt of Genet was mandated by the Take
Care Clause because, when Washington recognized the French
revolutionary government, the reception of its foreign minister
followed as a matter of course under the law of nations.
Vattel addressed the exchange of foreign diplomats between
recognized governments by emphasizing that "Nations must nec-
essarily treat and have intercourse with one another in order to
advance their interests, to avoid injuring one another, and to ad-
just and terminate their disputes."' Inasmuch as nations cannot
deal directly with one another as corporate entities, they "have no
other means of communicating and treating with one another
than .. . through the mediation of public ministers."24 0 His result-
ing doctrine was as follows:
Every sovereign State has, therefore, the right to send and to re-
ceive public ministers. For they are necessary agents in the negotia-
tion of the affairs which sovereigns have with one another, and in the
maintenance of the intercourse which sovereigns have the right to
keep up.
Such being the rights of Nations, the sovereign who undertakes to
prevent another sovereign from sending and receiving public minis-
ters does him an injury and violates the Law of Nations; for in doing
so he attacks the Nation in one of its most valuable rights... ; he
breaks the bonds which unite Nations together, and thereby does an
241injury to all of them.
And Vattel declared unequivocally that this right applies to all
states-the small and weak as well as the large and powerful. 24 2
Vattel noted that "[t]o dispute that right is to do a great injury to
the prince or State-it is equivalent to an attack upon the sover-
eignty of the prince or State in question."2 43
These principles provide an understanding of why Washington's
Cabinet had decided unanimously on March 30, 1793 to receive
Genet.2 4 It was a hard pill for Hamilton, who was concerned that
237. See Reinstein, supra note 229, at 812-16, 842-51.
238. See id. at 840.
239. VATTEL, supra note 25, bk. IV, § 55, at 362.
240. Id. § 56, at 362.
241. Id. §§ 57, 63, at 362, 364.
242. See id. § 78, at 369.
243. Id.
244. See Notes on the Reception of Edmond Charles Genet (Mar. 30, 1793), in 25 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 469, 469-70; see also supra notes 188-89
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the reception of Genet would imply the legitimacy of the revolu-
tionary government.2 45 Before the critical Cabinet meeting of April
19, 1793, Hamilton consulted Jay and floated a clever argument
to circumvent Vattel.2 46 Hamilton also asked Jay to draft a neu-
trality proclamation.
Jay helpfully drafted a proposed proclamation for Hamilton's
(and presumably Washington's) consideration.2 48 But Jay threw
cold water on Hamilton's argument for not receiving Genet. The
United States was bound under the law of nations to recognize the
revolutionary government of France and to receive its designated
minister.' Hamilton acquiesced and focused (unsuccessfully) on
his principal objective-declaring the treaties with France void or
suspended.
Genet's repeated violations of American neutrality and defiance
of Washington's decisions, culminating in the Little Sarah inci-
dent, caused his mission to implode and led the Cabinet, on Au-
and accompanying text (discussing Randolph's opinion to Washington in which he quoted
at length from Vattel in concluding that Genet must be received unconditionally).
245. See Letter from Alexander Hamilton to John Jay (Apr. 9, 1793), in 14 THE PAPERS
OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 67, at 297, 297-98.
246. See id. The argument was that France might be defeated by its European enemies,
who would then establish the Dauphin (presently in exile) as Regent and recognize him as
the country's legitimate ruler; and as Regent he would send a foreign minister. Id. at 297.
Given this uncertainty over who would be in actual possession of governmental power,
Hamilton asked: Should not the United States refuse to receive Genet? Id. at 298.
247. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to John Jay (Apr. 9, 1793), in 14 THE PAPERS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 67, at 299, 299-300.
248. Letter from John Jay to Alexander Hamilton (Apr. 11, 1793), in 14 THE PAPERS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 67, at 307, 308-10.
249. See id. at 308-09. Jay's draft proclamation stated that the present government of
France must be recognized as the lawful government and that foreign ministers must be
exchanged for diplomatic intercourse. See id. ("[I]t is no less the Duty than the Interest of
the United States, strictly to observe that conduct towards all nations, which the Laws of
nations prescribe."). Jay advised that a minister from the Dauphin should be received only
if the coalition defeated France and made him the Regent. Id. at 308.
250. The Little Sarah was a British merchant ship that was taken as a prize by a
French frigate and held at the port of Philadelphia. Editor's Note to Cabinet Opinions on
the Little Sarah (July 8, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at
446, 447. The ship, renamed the Little Democrat, was then armed with fourteen cannons
and appeared ready to sail as a privateer. Id.; Cabinet Opinions on the Little Sarah (July 8,
1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 446, 446. That action
would be in violation of Washington's prohibition on fitting privateers in U.S. ports and his
direction that those that were fitted must remain in port. Editor's Note to Cabinet Opin-
ions on the Little Sarah (July 8, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra
note 10, at 446, 447; see Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 1, at 341. Washington was not in
Philadelphia when Governor Mifflin asked for directions. See Editor's Note to Cabinet
Opinions on the Little Sarah (July 8, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON,
supra note 10, at 446, 447. Hamilton and Knox wanted to set up a battery manned by a
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gust 1, 1793, to decide to request his recall.251 This request was
done in a letter to Gouverneur Morris containing a bill of particu-
lars against Genet,25 2 which Morris would present to the French
government.' In requesting Genet's recall, the administration
was following Vattel's laws on diplomacy-a foreign minister is
duty bound to comply with the laws of his host nation. 25 4 Although
he is immune from punishment for violating those laws, that con-
duct is grounds for a request that he be recalled or, in extreme cir-
cumstances, expelled.25 5
party of militia that would use force, if necessary, to prevent the ship from leaving. See
Cabinet Opinions on the Little Sarah (July 8, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFER-
SON, supra note 10, at 446, 446-47. Jefferson objected to the use of force on the grounds
that it might lead to a war with France and that no decision should be made in Washing-
ton's absence. See Dissenting Opinion on the Little Sarah (July 8, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 449, 449. Jefferson thought that Genet promised
that the ship would not leave until the President returned. See Memorandum of a Conver-
sation with Edmond Charles Genet (July 10, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFER-
SON, supra note 10, at 463, 466. But either Jefferson misunderstood or this promise was a
ruse, as the Little Democrat sailed away. See Editor's Note to Cabinet Opinions on the Lit-
tle Sarah (July 8, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 446,
449. When Washington returned, he was livid, and Genet's defiance of Washington made
his recall inevitable. See ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 16, at 351-52.
Whether Washington would have authorized the use of force to contain the Little Demo-
crat remains unknown. Several days later, after the dust settled, Washington told the Cab-
inet that he "took for granted" that the governors would stop the arming of privateers "in
embryo" without force or by employing small parties of militia. Notes of a Cabinet Meeting
(July 15, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 508, 508. He
said that he had rejected the requests of four governors for cannons and that if they erected
batteries, they would then ask for soldiers to man them, which the President did not be-
lieve was within the Executive's power. See id.
251. See Notes of Cabinet Meeting on Edmond Charles Genet (Aug. 1, 1793), in 26 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 598, 598. The vote was unanimous, with
Jefferson by now regarding Genet as a huge albatross. Id.; see Letter from Thomas Jeffer-
son to James Madison (July 7, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note
10, at 443, 444.
252. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gouverneur Morris (Aug. 16, 1793), in 26 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 697, 697-711.
253. See Cabinet Opinions on Edmond Charles Genet (Aug. 23, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 745.
254. See VATTEL, supra note 25, bk. IV, § 95, at 377.
255. See id. at §§ 93-96, at 377-79. Similarly, Washington revoked the exequatur of a
French consul, Duplaine, who had led an armed force to liberate a prize being held by a
U.S. marshal pursuant to a court order. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Antoine Char-
bonnet Duplaine (Oct. 3, 1793), in 27 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at
184, 184-85. Jefferson justified the revocation of Duplaine's exequatur under the law of
nations citing the continental publicists. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond Charles
Genet (Nov. 15-22, 1793), in 27 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 378,
378-79. For the evidence against Duplaine, see Letter from Christopher Gore to Thomas
Jefferson (Sept. 10, 1793), in 27 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 79,
79-80.
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For months, the administration heard nothing from the French
government. 25 6 By the end of the year, Washington decided that
Genet's continued functioning as the French minister was intoler-
able.257 Even then, Washington was reluctant to unilaterally take
the provocative step of dismissing a foreign minister. In January
1794, Randolph, who succeeded Jefferson as Secretary of State,
drafted a message for Washington to send to Congress, stating
that the President would remove Genet's diplomatic authority un-
less either House objected.2 " But that message became moot when
Washington received a message from Morris that the Jacobins,
who had ousted the Girondins, had recalled Genet.!"
C. The Neutrality Proclamation
When Washington received confirmation that war had broken
out between France and Great Britain and the Netherlands, his
immediate concern was that overzealous Americans might enlist
in Genet's privateers and embroil the United States in the war.260
The first item on the agenda of the April 19, 1793 Cabinet meet-
ing was whether to issue what became known as the Neutrality
Proclamation.2 61 Jefferson initially objected that only Congress
had the constitutional authority to declare neutrality, because it
had the exclusive power to declare war.262 This objection must
have surprised Washington, because, when Jefferson first con-
256. Morris delivered the letter to the French government on October 8, 1793, and it
decided to recall Genet on October 11, 1793; but the news did not cross the ocean until
January. In the interim, the Cabinet debated whether to expel Genet but was unable to
reach a decision. Notes of Cabinet Meetings on Edmond Charles Genet and the President's
Address to Congress (Nov. 18, 1793), in 27 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note
10, at 339, 399-401.
257. JOHN MARSHALL, THE LIFE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 410 (Robert Faulkner & Paul
Carrese eds., 2000) [hereinafter MARSHALL, LIFE OF WASHINGTON].
258. See id. at 411.
259. Id.; see Editor's Note to Proposed Message to Congress Concering Revocation of
Edmond Charles Genet's Diplomatic Status (Jan. 6-13, 1794), in 15 THE PAPERS OF ALEX-
ANDER HAMILTON, supra note 67, at 625, 625 n.2; see also ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note
16, at 365-72 (discussing Genet's relationship and correspondence with Paris).
260. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
261. See Cabinet Opinion on Washington's Questions on Neutrality and the Alliance
with France (Apr. 19, 1793), in 25 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at
570, 570.
262. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (June 29, 1793), in 26 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 401, 403; see also Notes on Washington's
Questions on Neutrality and the Alliance with France (May 6, 1793), in 25 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 665, 666.
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cluded that the war had broken out, he told the President that it
is "necessary in my opinion that we take every justifiable measure
for preserving our neutrality."263 Hamilton's response effectively
disposed of this objection-the United States had treaties of peace
with each of the belligerents, and Congress had left the country in
264
a state of peace that the Executive was duty-bound to preserve.
Jefferson acquiesced in the issuance of the Proclamation, and the
Cabinet vote was unanimous.2
The Proclamation was drafted by Randolph and approved by
the Cabinet.266 The Proclamation's text is provided below,26 7 and it
263. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Washington (Apr. 7, 1793), in 25 THE PA-
PERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 518, 518.
264. Hamilton would make the same argument in his Pacificus letters. Alexander Ham-
ilton, Pacificus No. 1 (June 29, 1793), reprinted in 15 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMIL-
TON, supra note 67, at 33, 43 [hereinafter Pacificus No. 1].
265. Cabinet Opinion on Washington's Questions on Neutrality and the Alliance with
France (Apr. 19, 1793), in 25 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 570,
570. Jefferson told Madison that he went along with the Proclamation so that his opposi-
tion would not "prejudice what was the next question, the boldest and greatest that ever
was hazarded, and which would have called for extremities, had it prevailed." Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (June 23, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEF-
FERSON, supra note 10, at 346, 346. This statement was clearly a reference to the validity
of the treaties; the decision to receive Genet had been made on March 30, 1793.
In deference to Jefferson, the Cabinet agreed that the word "neutrality" would not ap-
pear in the Proclamation, even though Jefferson repeatedly used that word to describe the
legal condition of the United States both before and after the Proclamation was issued.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Jean Baptiste Ternant (Aug. 27, 1792), in 24 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 328, 328; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to C. W.
F. Dumas (Mar. 24, 1793), in 25 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 439,
439; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gouverneur Morris (Apr. 20, 1793), in 25 THE PA-
PERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 575, 576; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
Thomas Pinckney (Apr. 20, 1793), in 25 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10,
at 577, 578; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Wythe (Apr. 27, 1793), in 25 THE PA-
PERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 597, 597; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
James Madison (Apr. 28, 1793), in 25 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10,
at 619, 619. Indeed, shortly after the Proclamation was issued, Jefferson told Randolph
that "the occurrence of a foreign war has brought into activity the laws of neutrality, as a
part of the law of the land." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Randolph (May 8,
1793), in 25 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON supra note 10, at 691, 692. Jefferson never
explained why he objected to the use of the word "neutrality" in the Proclamation. Chief
Justice Jay had also decided to omit the word "neutrality" in the draft Proclamation that
he sent to Hamilton because, he said, that term was sometimes misunderstood in the coun-
try. Letter from John Jay to Alexander Hamilton (Apr. 11, 1793), in 14 THE PAPERS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 67, at 307, 308.
266. When his followers attacked the Proclamation, Jefferson said that he did not pay
close attention to its wording but only checked that the word "neutrality" did not appear.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (June 23, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 346, 346; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James
Madison (Aug. 11, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 649,
649-50; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 11, 1793), in 26 THE PA-
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will be seen that Randolph took the language directly out of Vat-
tel.
The Proclamation begins by stating that the "duty and interest
of the United States" requires it to "pursue a conduct friendly and
impartial toward the belligerent powers."26 8 "Friendly" and "im-
partial" are Vattel's keynote words for strict neutrality.2 69 The
Proclamation then declares that the United States and all citizens
must carefully avoid "all acts and proceedings whatsoever" that
would conflict with impartiality.2 70 This phrasing echoes Vattel's
maxim that strict neutrality means "[t]o give no help" to any bel-
ligerent.2
Next, the Proclamation warns the citizens of the United States
of the dangers in carrying contraband to a belligerent.2 72 Vattel
stated that the law of nations did not prohibit the private trade in
contraband.2 73 However, he urged that citizens should be warned
that contraband shipped to a belligerent could be confiscated by
PERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 651, 651.
267. WHEREAS it appears that a state of war exists between Austria, Prussia,
Sardinia, Great-Britain, and the United Netherlands, of the one part, and
France on the other, and the duty and interest of the United States require, that
they should with sincerity and good faith adopt and pursue a conduct friendly
and impartial toward the belligerent powers:
I have therefore thought fit by these presents to declare the disposition of
the United States to observe the conduct aforesaid towards those powers respec-
tively; and to exhort and warn the citizens of the United States carefully to
avoid all acts and proceedings whatsoever, which may in any manner tend to
contravene such disposition.
And I do hereby also make known that whosoever of the citizens of the Unit-
ed States shall render himself liable to punishment or forfeiture under the law
of nations, by committing, aiding or abetting hostilities against any of the said
powers, or by carrying to any of them those articles, which are deemed contra-
band by the modern usage of nations, will not receive the protection of the Unit-
ed States, against such punishment or forfeiture: and further, that I have given
instructions to those officers, to whom it belongs, to cause prosecutions to be in-
stituted against all persons, who shall, within the cognizance of the courts of the
United States, violate the Law of Nations, with respect to the powers at war, or
any of them.
Neutrality Proclamation (Apr. 22, 1793), reprinted in 12 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASH-
INGTON, supra note 39, at 472, 472-73.
268. Id. at 472.
269. See VATTEL, supra note 25, bk. III, § 103, at 268.
270. Neutrality Proclamation (Apr. 22, 1793), reprinted in 12 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON, supra note 39, at 472, 472-73.
271. VATTEL, supra note 25, bk. III, § 104, at 268.
272. Neutrality Proclamation (Apr. 22, 1793), reprinted in 12 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON, supra note 39, at 472, 473.
273. VATTEL, supra note 25, bk. III, § 112, at 271.
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its enemy and that their government would do nothing to protect
them.2 " Otherwise, "[i]f their sovereign should undertake to pro-
tect them, the act would be equivalent to a desire on his part to
furnish such help-an attitude certainly inconsistent with neu-
trality."27 5 This warning is the one that Washington gave in the
Proclamation."'
Private military acts by citizens against a belligerent were par-
ticular threats to neutrality, because they could easily be blamed
on the citizens' government. To Vattel, an offending citizen's na-
tion that could have prevented such acts but did not was as re-
sponsible as if it had committed the acts itself.277 He understood
the realistic limits on the ability of any government to control its
citizens."' But "[a] sovereign who refuses to repair the evil done
by one of his subjects, or to punish the criminal, or, finally, to de-
liver him up, makes himself in a way an accessory to the deed,
and becomes responsible for it.""' Hence Washington's final warn-
ing in the Proclamation was that the government would prosecute
any person within the jurisdiction of the United States who com-
mitted an act of hostility against any of the belligerents, in viola-
tion of the law of nations.'
Although Randolph carefully tracked Vattel in drafting the
Neutrality Proclamation, he omitted any reference to the treaties
with France, and this omission raised a firestorm among Ameri-
can supporters of France.2 8' They did not believe that the United
274. Id. § 113, at 272.
275. Id.
276. When Hammond complained that American citizens were selling contraband to
French agents, Jefferson responded that such private trades did not violate the law of na-
tions. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Hammond (May 15, 1793), in 26 THE PA-
PERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 38, 38-39. He said that the only duty of the
United States was to warn its citizens that the contraband could be subject to confiscation
and that they were not subject to the protection of the government, as the President had
made clear in the Proclamation. See id. at 39; Neutrality Proclamation (Apr. 22, 1793),
reprinted in 12 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON PAPERS, supra note 39, at 472-73.
277. VATTEL, supra note 25, bk. II, § 72, at 136.
278. Id. § 73, at 136.
279. Id. § 77, at 137.
280. Neutrality Proclamation (Apr. 22, 1793), reprinted in 12 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON, supra note 39, at 472, 473.
281. See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (May 8, 1793), in 25 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 688, 688-89; Letter from James Madison
to Thomas Jefferson (June 19, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note
10, at 323, 324.
2012] 431
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
States was or should be "impartial" between France and Britain.2 82
Of course the United States had a Treaty of Peace with Great
Britain.283 But did not the United States have a Treaty of Amity
and Commerce and a Treaty of Alliance with France?28 4 Did the
President unilaterally declare those treaties with France to be of
no effect? What power did the Executive have to rescind a treaty?
And if he meant to comply with the treaties, how could the United
States be "impartial"?2 85
Randolph was well aware that under Vattel's laws of neutrality,
compliance with the obligations of preexisting treaties, including
providing moderate support under a defensive alliance, was not
inconsistent with strict neutrality. He emphasized that very point
in his opinion to Washington on the continued validity of the
French treaties."' But Randolph could not state this point in the
Proclamation because it was issued before Washington's decision
that the treaties were still valid. The exclusion of the treaties
from the Proclamation could certainly leave the (false) impression
that Washington considered the treaties with France as no longer
binding on the United States. And it provided an opening for
Hamilton, who had lost that argument in the privacy of the Cabi-
net, to persuade the public that the Proclamation did nullify one
282. See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (May 8, 1793), 25 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 688, 688-89.
283. Definitive Treaty of Peace, supra note 19.
284. Treaty of Amity and Commerce, supra note 20; Treaty of Alliance, supra note 22.
285. See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (May 8, 1793), in 25 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 688, 688-89; Letter from James Madison
to Thomas Jefferson (June 13, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note
10, at 272, 272-73; Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (June 19, 1793), in 26
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 323, 324 (complaining about the
omission of the treaties from the Proclamation and its possible effects on changing the
United States' relations with France); Letter from James Monroe to Thomas Jefferson
(June 27, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 381, 382-84.
They also objected to the term "disposition," claiming that the President could not bind the
nation's future course. Jefferson's typical response was that he supported the substance of
the Proclamation but that it was badly drafted by Randolph. See Letter from Thomas Jef-
ferson to James Monroe (July 14, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra
note 10, at 501, 501-02; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 11, 1793),
in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 649, 649-50.
286. Letter from Edmund Randolph to George Washington (May 6, 1793), in 12 THE
PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 39, at 534, 546 ("This treaty was made many
years ago without relation to the present war; and it is therefore no breach of neutrality to
fulfil it. . . ."); id. at 547 ("[A]Itho' it would be an infraction of neutrality to elect, (if we had
the power of choosing) the operation of the treaties, the U.S. are bound to admit them to be
applicable to the present situation.
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treaty provision (the guarantee) and left the remaining provisions
in suspense.
This error of omission was not repeated in the Rules on Neu-
trality that were issued on August 3, 1793.288 These rules also
tracked Vattel in distinguishing between equipping vessels for
military purposes, which was prohibited, and equipping merchant
ships for commercial purposes, which was allowed. 2" However, for
each of these rules, exceptions were made for the benefit of France
when required by the treaties.2"o
Even if the Proclamation had affirmed the continued validity of
the treaties with France, as did the Rules on Neutrality, that
probably would not have satisfied the ardently pro-French faction
in the United States; but it would have removed a painful thorn.
As events turned out, most of the country rallied behind Washing-
ton because Genet's repeated misconduct created an enormous
backlash2 9' and because, after all, Washington's adherence to the
laws of neutrality had helped keep the country from being
dragged into war.
287. See Pacificus No. 1, supra note 264, at 33, 36 ("[The Proclamation is virtually a
manifestation of the sense of the Government that the U[nited] States are, under the cir-
cumstances of the case, not bound to execute the clause of the Guarantee."); Alexander
Hamilton, Pacificus No. 2 (July 3, 1793), reprinted in 15 THE PAPERS OF HAMILTON, supra
note 67, at 55, 56-58 [hereinafter Pacificus No. 2] (stating that the treaty of alliance was a
defensive treaty that should not apply because France is the aggressor in the present war).
The mistaken idea that the Neutrality Proclamation had the effect of renouncing the
French treaties still has currency. See Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., & Bradford R. Clark, The
Federal Common Law of Nations, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 49 (2009). Washington not only
stated that the treaties were still in effect but, following the issuance of the Proclamation,
asked the Supreme Court to interpret nine of their provisions and then incorporated them
into the Rules on Neutrality. See supra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
288. See Rules on Neutrality (Aug. 3, 1793), reprinted in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 608, 608-09.
289. Id. at 608.
290. Id. at 608-09.
291. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 7, 1793), in 26 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 443, 444 (calling Genet's appointment
"calamitous"); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 11, 1793), in 26 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 651, 651-52 (stating that the public is
strongly against Genet and in favor of Proclamation, that it is time to stop "little cavils"
about whether the President or Congress should declare neutrality, and that he expects
Congress to pass a neutrality law with an expression of friendship to France); Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 18, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEF-
FERSON, supra note 10, at 720, 720 (complaining that addresses in support of the Procla-
mation are becoming "universal" because of the support for the President over Genet); Let-
ter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Sept. 2, 1793), in 27 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 16, 16 (expressing distress that Genet turned the public
against France).
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D. Criminal Prosecutions and the Law of Nations
Gideon Henfield was an American citizen who, in May 1793, en-
listed in the French military service on board a privateer named
(appropriately enough) the Citizen Genet.292 The French privateer
captured the British ship William.' Henfield was given the post
of Prize Master of the William and sailed it as a prize into the port
of Philadelphia.294
The Neutrality Proclamation had followed Vattel in warning
Americans that they would be prosecuted for committing acts of
military hostility against any of the belligerents in violation of the
law of nations.295 With Washington's approval, Jefferson instruct-
ed William Rawle, the United States Attorney, to prosecute such
violators;29 6 and Rawle instituted the prosecution of Henfield.29 7
This prosecution was the final straw for some members of the
pro-French faction who had initially given Washington the benefit
of the doubt. What law, James Monroe asked Jefferson, had Hen-
field violated? No statute existed that prohibited an American
from enlisting in the military service of a foreign country; and,
inasmuch as Britain and France were at war, Henfield's conduct
could not be considered piracy.' Prosecuting an American for vio-
292. 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 203, at 340.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Compare VATIEL, supra note 25, bk. II, § 71, at 136, with Neutrality Proclamation
(Apr. 22, 1793), reprinted in 12 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 39, at
472, 473.
296. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Rawle (May 15, 1793), in 26 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 40, 41 (directing the prosecution to be
instituted); Letter from George Washington to Thomas Jefferson (May 15, 1793), in 26 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 45, 45 (approving instructions to Rawle).
At that time, the United States Attorneys reported to the Secretary of State.
297. Editor's Note to Letter to William Rawle from Thomas Jefferson (May 15, 1793), in
26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 40, 41.
298. Letter from James Monroe to Thomas Jefferson (June 27, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 381, 383-84. For Jefferson's reply, see Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe (July 14, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 501, 502 (noting Henfield's prosecution was supported by an
official opinion of the Attorney General which "coincided with all our private opinions"). See
also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Randolph (May 8, 1793), in 25 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 691, 692 (stating that "the occurrence of a foreign
war has brought into activity the laws of neutrality, as a part of the law of the land," and
that the judges will enforce this law through their charges to grand juries, which will be
published).
Jefferson's support for law of nations prosecutions seems difficult to square with his
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lating an executive proclamation was all too reminiscent of the
constitutional disputes with the Stuart kings," "which resonated
still in eighteenth-century America.",O
However, Henfield was not prosecuted for violating the Neu-
trality Proclamation; he was prosecuted for violating the law of
nations."' The Supreme Court had not yet eliminated common law
crimes,302 and precedents were in place upon which the Washing-
ton administration acted in prosecuting Henfield.
The first precedent was the famous Longchamps case,"' which
occurred during the Confederation period. Longchamps had
threatened Marbois, the Consul General and Secretary of the
French delegation, in the home of the French minister and then
strenuous opposition to federal common law prosecutions. Yet a major distinction is pre-
sent between the two. Jefferson opposed federal common law prosecutions, because he saw
them as a powerful instrument of a consolidated government-that is, federal prosecutions
could be brought for conduct that was outside of Congress's power to regulate. See Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to Gideon Granger (Aug. 13, 1800), in 7 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 450, 450-51 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1896). That problem was not present in
law of nations prosecutions inasmuch as they were within the scope of an enumerated con-
gressional power, and the Constitution gave the United States exclusive power over foreign
affairs.
299. See, e.g., 1 HENRY HALLAM, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE Ac-
CESSION OF HENRY VII TO THE DEATH OF GEORGE II 330-31, 411-12 (London, John Murray
new ed. 1876); 4 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 296-97 (Little,
Brown, and Co. 1924); 6 id. at 31.
300. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 245 (1996).
301. Compare Blackstone's discussion of the proper uses of executive proclamations:
For, though the making of laws is entirely the work of a distinct part, the leg-
islative branch, ... [executive] proclamations, are binding upon the subject,
where they do not either contradict the old laws or tend to establish new ones;
but only enforce the execution of such laws as are already in being ....
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 108, at *270.
302. See United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812). While United States
courts "no doubt possess powers not immediately derived from statute," the "exercise of
criminal jurisdiction in common law cases . . . is not within their implied powers." Id. at 34.
Even after the Hudson decision, the validity of nonstatutory criminal prosecutions for vio-
lating the law of nations was unsettled. Justice Story, sitting on circuit, argued that law of
nations prosecutions were still viable, at least if they fell within the admiralty jurisdiction.
United States v. Coolidge, 25 F. Cas. 622, 623 (C.C. D. Mass. 1815) (No. 14,858). The case
went to the Supreme Court on a certificate of division. United States v. Coolidge, 14 U.S. (1
Wheat.) 415, 415 (1816). Justice Johnson announced that the Court was divided on the
issue, but that the Attorney General declined to argue, and no counsel appeared for the
defendant. Id. at 416. The Court therefore decided to instruct the circuit court to apply the
Hudson decision. Id. at 416-17. This odd outcome brought to an end nonstatutory law of
nations prosecutions.
303. Respublica v. De Longehamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111 (Phila. 0. & T. 1784).
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assaulted Marbois on a public street.o4 Congress passed a resolu-
tion declaring that Longchamps's actions violated the law of na-
tions and called on the states to prosecute him "that he may be
brought to justice for his said violation of the laws of nations and
of the land.""o' Pennsylvania responded to this summons and pros-
ecuted Longchamps.os Chief Justice McKean declared that the
law of nations "form[s] a part of the municipal law of Pennsylva-
nia,""o' and "in its full extent, is part of the law of this State."0 '
Longchamps was found guilty of violating the law of nations,0 '
was fined, and was sentenced to two years imprisonment.ao
In 1790, shortly after the federal judiciary was organized, the
Justices travelled on circuit to charge grand juries. The first
charge was given by Chief Justice Jay to a federal grand jury in
New York."' He advised the grand jury that it had jurisdiction
over violations of the law of nations, which was part of the law of
the United States.3 12 Justice James Wilson gave similar charges
the following year to grand juries in Virginia' and Pennsylva-
*314
nia. 1
The first federal nonstatutory law of nations prosecution was
brought in 1792 against a Philadelphia constable named Meeker.
Meeker had entered the home of Van Berckel, the Netherlands
foreign minister, to serve process on one of his servants, who then
paid the constable 25, the amount owed."' Van Berckel protested
304. Id. at 111.
305. Report of the Committee of Congress on a Note from the Minister of France re-
specting an Assault and Battery on Mr. Marbois (May 28, 1784), in 6 REVOLUTIONARY DIP-
LOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 78, at 810-11 (adopted May 29, 1784).
306. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. at 118.
307. Id. at 114.
308. Id. at 116.
309. See VATTEL, supra note 25, bk IV, § 117, at 394 (stating that minister's home is
inviolable, and anyone who violates it commits "a crime against the State and against all
Nations"); id. § 122, at 396 (stating that secretary of an embassy enjoys the same immuni-
ties and protections as foreign ministers).
310. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. at 118.
311. John Jay's Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of New
York (Apr. 12, 1790), in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 203, at 25.
312. Id. at 29.
313. James Wilson's Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of
Virginia (May 23, 1791), in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 203, at 166, 179.
314. James Wilson's Charge to the Grand Jury of a Special Session of the Circuit Court
for the District of Pennsylvania (Aug. 15, 1791), in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 203, at 197, 199.
315. See Letter from Edmund Randolph to Thomas Jefferson (June 21, 1792), in 24 THE
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this invasion of his diplomatic residence.' Randolph issued an
opinion that "[t]he law of nations, tho' not specially adapted by the
constitution, or any municipal act, is essentially a part of the law
of the land."17 Randolph pointed out that a federal statute might
cover this case, and, if it did, Congress would not intend that a
separate prosecution be brought under the law of nations.31 But if
the statute did not cover Meeker's actions, then he was subject to
a law of nations prosecution."' Jefferson informed Van Berckel
that the constable's actions did not violate the federal statute (be-
cause the servant was not properly registered, as required by that
law) and that a law of nations prosecution could be instituted
against the constable.320 Van Berckel agreed,321 and Rawle, at Jef-
ferson's direction, instituted a law of nations prosecution.32 2
The next precedent involved Ravara, the consul from Genoa,
who was indicted for sending threatening letters to the British
minister, Hammond.' Ravara's defense was that consuls should
be afforded diplomatic immunity.' Rawle responded that under
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 127, 127-28; Letter from William Rawle
to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 8, 1792), in 24 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note
10, at 452, 452.
316. See Letter from Edmund Randolph to Thomas Jefferson (June 26, 1792), in 24 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 127, 127.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 128. Bellia and Clark claim that Randolph's opinion concludes that a law of
nations prosecution could not be brought because a federal statute existed on the subject.
Bellia & Clark, supra note 287, at 48. But Randolph made clear that this result would fol-
low only if the statute actually applied to Meeker; and, because it did not, he was subse-
quently indicted for violating the law of nations. See infra notes 321-23 and accompanying
text.
320. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to F. P. Van Berckel (July 2, 1793), in 24 THE PA-
PERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 149, 149-50. In this letter, Jefferson told
Van Berckel that the alternative was for the servant to file a lawsuit to recover the Y5 that
she had given the constable. See id.
321. Letter from F. P. Van Berckel to Thomas Jefferson (July 4, 1793), in 24 THE PA-
PERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 157, 157-58; see 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HIs-
TORY, supra note 203, at 20 n.4.
322. Letter from William Rawle to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 8, 1793), in 24 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 452, 452. Meeker's prosecution was dropped be-
cause Van Berckel decided that the alderman who directed Meeker to serve process should
have been prosecuted instead of Meeker. See 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note
203, at 320 n.4.
323. United States v. Ravara, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 297, 297, 27 F. Cox 713 (C.C. D. Pa. 1793)
(No. 16,122).
324. See id. at 299 n.1. He relied on Vattel, who stated that a consul was not a diplo-
matic agent but should be given some privileges, including a qualified exemption from
domestic criminal laws "unless he commit a grievous offense against the Law of Nations."
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the law of nations, public ministers are entitled to high diplomatic
privileges while consuls are not.32' Ravara's defense was rejected
by the court on the merits, and he was found guilty. 326
These cases were the precedents on enforcement of the law of
nations upon which the Washington administration prosecuted
Henfield. After the Neutrality Proclamation was issued, Jay wrote
a grand jury charge to justify prosecutions against Americans who
committed hostile acts against a belligerent.327 Jay stated that the
laws of the United States fell under three classifications: treaties
made under the authority of the United States, the law of nations,
and the Constitution and statutes of the United States.2 Quoting
at length from Vattel, Jay said that Washington's Proclamation
was declaratory of the laws of nations, including the duty of the
government, as a neutral, to prevent American citizens from
committing acts of hostility against any nation with which the
United States was at peace. 329 It is not sufficient, Jay said, that a
neutral should withdraw its protection from those who commit,
aid, or abet hostilities against belligerents; to preserve its neutral-
ity, the United States must also prosecute and punish them:
From the observations which have been made, this conclusion ap-
pears to result, viz.: That the United States are in a state of neutrali-
ty relative to all the powers at war, and that it is their duty, their in-
terest, and their disposition to maintain it: that, therefore, they who
commit, aid, or abet hostilities against these powers, or either of
them, offend against the laws of the United States, and ought to be
punished; and consequently, that it is your duty, gentlemen, to in-
quire into and present all such of these offences, as you shall find to
have been committed. . . .a'
VATTEL, supra note 25, bk. II, § 34, at 124.
325. Ravara, 2 U.S. at 299 n.1. If the reporter is correct that Rawle argued against any
immunity for consuls, this case is an instance in which the administration did not follow
Vattel, who was an outlier on this issue.
326. Id. at 298, 299 n.1. The reporter describes Ravara's case as a common law prosecu-
tion. Whether it was that or a statutory prosecution, see CASTO, SUPREME COURT, supra
note 109, at 140, the relevance of the case for this paper is that the defense was based on
the law of nations, and the court considered that defense on the merits. Apparently,
Ravara was later pardoned on the condition that he surrender his commission and exequa-
tur. Ravara, 2 U.S. at 299 n.1.
327. John Jay's Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of Virgin-
ia (May 22, 1793), reprinted in Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1102-03 (C.C. D. Pa. 1793)
(No. 6,360).
328. Id. at 1100-01.
329. Id. at 1101-02.
330. Id. at 1103-04.
438 [Vol. 46:373
EXECUTIVE POWER
Justice Wilson gave a very similar charge to the grand jury con-
sidering Henfield's actions, emphasizing, as did Jay, that treaties
and the law of nations were part of the laws of the United
States."' The grand jury returned an indictment containing sev-
eral counts against Henfield for violating the Treaty of Peace with
Great Britain332 and the law of nations."' The facts at trial were
not disputed: Henfield was a United States citizen who committed
military acts of hostility against a country with which the United
States was at peace.334 With the concurrence of Justice Iredell and
Judge Peters, Justice Wilson then charged the jury:
It is the joint and unanimous opinion of the court, that the United
States, being in a state of neutrality relative to the present war, the
acts of hostility committed by Gideon Henfield are an offence against
this country, and punishable by its laws. It has been asked by his
counsel, in their address to you, against what law has he offend-
ed? ... As a citizen of the United States, he was bound to act no part
which could injure the nation; he was bound to keep the peace in re-
gard to all nations with whom we are at peace. This is the law of na-
tions; not an ex post facto law, but a law that was in existence long
before Gideon Henfield existed.3 3 5
It is noteworthy that Jay's and Wilson's charges were consistent
with those that they had given to grand juries before the Neutrali-
ty Crisis occurred. But juries were arbiters of both law and fact,
and Henfield's jury returned a verdict of not guilty.'
Henfield was not the only American who was prosecuted for
serving on French privateers. The administration also obtained an
indictment against Joseph Rivers and three others in Georgia, but
they too were acquitted by a jury, "contrary to the opinion of the
judges.""' Other prosecutions for neutrality violations were like-
wise unsuccessful.3
331. See id. at 1106-08.
332. See Definitive Treaty of Peace, supra note 19.
333. Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. at 1109-12.
334. Id. at 1117.
335. Id. at 1120.
336. Id. at 1122.
337. CASTO, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 1, at 100 (internal quotation marks omitted).
338. See id. at 100-02. The grand jury refused to indict the French consul Duplaine,
who had 'liberated" a prize from a U.S. marshal, because some grand jurors doubted the
legality of the marshal's writ. Letter from Christopher Gore to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 21,
1793), in 27 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 261, 261.
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The Washington administration acted on the belief that by
prosecuting Henfield and others it was fulfilling its duty to follow
the obligations of the law of nations as expounded by Vattel, and
the federal judges, including three Justices of the Supreme Court,
validated the administration as a matter of law. But by applying
the law of nations domestically to prosecute individual Americans,
the administration was pushing the envelope towards the appear-
ance of government by executive decree, a measure that was
bound to produce strenuous opposition regardless of the opinions
of the continental publicists or the federal judges. Jury nullifica-
tion could signal public rejection of the proposition that the Presi-
dent can use his duty to comply with the law of nations to act co-
ercively against American citizens in the United States."
Washington was enough of a realist to understand that he
needed congressional support. When Congress reconvened in De-
cember 1793, he asked for legislation that would enact into posi-
tive law the neutrality principles that the administration had
adopted.340 After a lengthy debate, Congress gave Washington
practically all that he wanted in the Neutrality Act and, in effect,
ratified his actions.34 1
339. Several explanations were provided for Henfield's acquittal. John Marshall
thought that the Republican Party attacks on the Proclamation in the press had helped
make the public (and the jury) believe that they were being asked to give a proclamation
the force of law, and to subject themselves to the will of the Executive. See MARSHALL, LIFE
OF WASHINGTON, supra note 257, at 389-90. To Hamilton, it was a case of nullification by a
pro-French jury. See Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George Washington (Aug. 5,
1793), in 15 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 67, at 194, 194. Jefferson,
who had been in regular contact with Rawle, thought that Henfield was acquitted because
it appeared at trial that he was ignorant of the unlawfulness of his actions and showed real
contrition, that mitigating circumstances existed, and that the jury in effect pardoned him.
See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gouverneur Morris (Aug. 16, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 697, 702.
340. See Speech of the President of the United States to Both Houses of Congress (Dec.
3, 1793), in 1 STATE PAPERS AND PUBLICK DOCUMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, FROM THE
ACCESSION OF GEORGE WASHINGTON TO THE PRESIDENCY, EXHIBITING A COMPLETE VIEW OF
OUR FOREIGN RELATIONS SINCE THAT TIME 39, 39-40 (3d ed. 1819) [hereinafter STATE PA-
PERS AND PUBLICK DOCUMENTS]; David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Third
Congress, 1793-1795, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 14-16 (1996).
341. See Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 50, 1 Stat. 381, 381-84. The statute prohibited Ameri-
can citizens from enlisting to serve in war in the armed forces of another country; prohibit-
ed any person within the jurisdiction of the United States from enlisting in or recruiting for
foreign vessels of war or privateers; prohibited any person within U.S. jurisdiction from
fitting out, arming, or augmenting any ship of war or privateer to commit hostilities
against any nation with which the United States was at peace; prohibited any person with-
in U.S. jurisdiction from conducting or preparing a military expedition against a nation
with which the United States was at peace; gave the district courts jurisdiction over foreign
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The law of nations empowered the Washington administration,
through the Take Care Clause, to implement policies that it con-
sidered necessary to secure neutral obligations and rights. How-
ever, two important matters remained in which the law of nations
did not authorize the administration to adopt policies that it con-
sidered necessary, and the administration complied with these
restraints.
E. The Law of Nations as a Restraint on Executive Power
1. The Sale of Prizes
The sales of French captured prizes was one of the more diffi-
cult issues for the administration. Article XXII of the Treaty of
Amity and Commerce with France prohibited the enemies of
France from fitting out privateers in U.S. ports and from selling
their prizes in the United States."' It did not explicitly authorize
France to do either, and Jefferson's initial view was that, applying
the principle of strict neutrality, France should be prohibited from
doing both."4 However, the administration decided that the two
issues were different. It prohibited France from fitting out priva-
teers to prey on British commerce and even ordered privateers
that had been fitted before the prohibition was published to leave
the United States;3 44 but "as to the prizes taken by them, no power
captures; and authorized the President to use force to ensure compliance with the prohibi-
tions relating to ships of war and privateers. Id. The anti-privateering provisions of the act
were extended in 1797 to U.S. citizens acting outside of U.S. jurisdiction. Act of June 14,
1797, ch. 1, Stat. 520, 520. Even after the Neutrality Act was passed, Justices Iredell and
Paterson continued to defend the Neutrality Proclamation and nonstatutory law of nations
prosecutions, viewing the Neutrality Act as declaratory of the law of nations. See James
Iredell's Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of Connecticut (Apr.
25, 1795), 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 203, at 28, 30; William Paterson's
Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of Delaware (June 8, 1795),
id. at 57, 58-60; James Iredell's Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania (Apr. 12, 1796), id. at 106, 109-12; James Iredell's Charge to the
Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania (Apr. 11, 1797), id. at 163,
166-67.
342. Treaty of Amity and Commerce, supra note 20, at art. XXII, 8 Stat. at 24.
343. Opinion on the Treaties with France (Apr. 28, 1793), in 25 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 608, 611 ("[Article XXII] prohibits the enemies of France from
fitting out privateers in our ports, or selling their prizes here. But we are free to refuse the
same thing to France, there being no stipulation to the contrary, and we ought to refuse it
on principles of fair neutrality.").
344. See Cabinet Memorandum on French Privateers (June 1, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 155, 155.
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less than that of the legislature can prohibit their sale."04' Ran-
dolph later explained that there was insufficient support among
the continental publicists for prohibiting private sales, with Vattel
and others stating that such prohibitions were not required by the
laws of neutrality.
The economic incentive for privateering had been reduced by
the administration's decision that the operation of French consu-
lar courts in the United States was illegal.34 7 With French consu-
lar courts being unable to conduct condemnation proceedings and
the United States district judges disclaiming jurisdiction over for-
eign captures,"' no realistic way existed for the captors to obtain
title to their prizes. Direct sales of the prizes left purchasers vul-
nerable to suits by the original owners.349 This risk reduced the
value of the ships that were claimed as prizes but did not realisti-
cally affect the sales of fungible cargo."'o Thus, the absence of legal
condemnation made privateering less lucrative but did not elimi-
nate it. The British wanted to end, and not merely reduce, priva-
teering; and Hammond complained bitterly about the administra-
tion's refusal to prohibit sales.' But Hammond was preaching to
the choir-the administration also wished to end this dangerous
irritant. The problem was obtaining the necessary legal authority.
When Congress met in December 1793, Washington advised
that the Executive lacked authority to stop the sales of prizes, and
the administration's supporters sought remedial legislation. 352 The
Senate included a provision in the neutrality bill that prohibited
the sales, but this provision was struck by the House.5 Jay was in
London to negotiate a treaty that would avoid an otherwise immi-
nent war with Great Britain.354 Washington's instructions to Jay
included a directive that the sale of French prizes should be pro-
345. Id.
346. See Letter from Edmund Randolph to George Hammond (June 2, 1794), in 1 AMER.
ICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 10, at 464, 465.
347. See CASTO, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 1, at 39-40, 510-52.
348. See id. at 89.
349. See id. at 40, 80.
350. See id. at 80-81.
351. See Memorial from George Hammond to Thomas Jefferson (Sept. 4, 1793), in 27
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 30, 30-31.
352. Speech of the President of the United States to Both Houses of Congress (Dec. 3,
1793), in 1 STATE PAPERS AND PUBLICK DOCUMENTS, supra note 340, at 39, 39-40.
353. HYNEMAN, AMERICAN NEUTRALITY, supra note 13, at 122-23.
354. See ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 16, at 395-97.
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hibited in American ports."' Hamilton notified Jay that the Neu-
trality Act had passed but that the prohibition on the sale of priz-
es had been defeated in the House. 356A provision was then inserted
in the Jay Treaty that prohibited the sales of prizes in the United
States by any enemy of Great Britain."" Thus, the Executive ob-
tained authority through the treaty power to prohibit conduct that
was beyond its authority under the law of nations and the Take
Care Clause."'
2. "Free Ships Make Free Goods"
The second example of the law of nations being a restraint on
executive policy relates to one of the principles of neutral rights
held most dearly by Americans-that "free ships make free
goods." Under this principle, noncontraband goods carried by a
neutral vessel are immune from seizure. This policy was adopted
by Congress in 1776, in its model treaty of friendship and com-
merce, and was incorporated in the treaties negotiated during the
Confederation period," including the Treaty of Amity and Com-
merce with France."'o Moreover, the nations that joined in the
League of Armed Neutrality during the American War of Inde-
pendence adopted "free ships make free goods" and threatened to
enforce it with their navies.' But Great Britain had not recog-
nized the legitimacy of this principle and did not respect it during
355. Id. at 397.
356. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to John Jay (June 4, 1794), in 16 THE PAPERS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 67, at 456, 456-57.
357. Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Nov. 19, 1794, art.
XXIV, 8 Stat. 116, 128; see CASTO, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 1 at 176.
358. That result left the problem of how to enforce the Jay Treaty's ban on the sale of
French prizes. Inasmuch as Congress had refused to ban those sales in the Neutrality Act,
seeking implementing legislation would appear to be a dead end. The courts provided the
solution. The British vice-consul in Charleston petitioned Chief Justice Ellsworth to enjoin
the sale of a prize ship that had been brought into port by a French cruiser. 3 THE DOCU.
MENTARY HISTORY, supra note 203, at 89. Ellsworth declared that Article XXIV of the Jay
Treaty prohibited the sale of French prizes in the United States and issued the injunction.
Id.
359. See BEMIS, DIPLOMATIC HISTORY, supra note 43, at 25-26; HERRING, supra note 86,
at 16-17.
360. Treaty of Amity and Commerce, supra note 20, at art. XXIII, 8 Stat. at 24, 26.
When the administration received information that France had decided to violate this prin-
ciple, it decided provisionally to protest that action unless an exception was made for
American shipping as required by the treaty. See Cabinet Opinions on the Roland and
Relations with Great Britain, France, and the Creeks (Aug. 31, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 795, 796.
361. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
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the Neutrality Crisis, repeatedly seizing noncontraband French
goods on U.S. vessels while paying compensation to the masters of
the vessels.6
When Genet complained that these British seizures violated the
neutral rights of the United States, Jefferson reluctantly told him
that, although this practice violated a policy to which the United
States was devoted, no treaty was in place with Britain guaran-
teeing that policy, and it was not required by the law of nations.363
According to continental publicists such as Vattel, the non-
contraband goods of an enemy being carried on a neutral vessel
could be seized as long as compensation was given to the master
of the vessel.364 Inasmuch as a uniform practice had not emerged
that could have called this doctrine into question, free ships still
did not make free goods under the law of nations.' To be sure, the
United States lacked the military power to enforce such a position
against Great Britain;66 but that inability would not have pre-
vented the administration from protesting diplomatically, as it did
for British practices that it believed were prohibited by the law of
nations.36 This position was an issue about which the administra-
362. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond Charles Genet (July 24, 1793),
in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 557, 557-58.
363. Id.
364. VATTEL, supra note 25, bk. III, § 115, at 273 ("If property belonging to the enemy is
found upon a neutral vessel, the law of war allows its seizure; but the freight should
properly be paid to the master of the ship, who is not to suffer by the seizure.").
365. And so the Supreme Court held when the issue finally reached it in the wake of the
War of 1812. See The Nereide Case, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 418-21 (1815).
366. Thomas Pinckney, the U.S. minister to Great Britain, sounded out Sweden and
Denmark, two members of the 1780 League of Armed Neutrality, about the feasibility of
recreating such a league that would defend neutral shipping under the principle of "free
ships make free goods." Pinckney reported that "[t]he opinions of both in short are, that the
neutral powers are not strong enough to cause their rights to be respected." Letter from
Thomas Pinckney to Thomas Jefferson (Aug. 15, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEF-
FERSON, supra note 10, at 673, 673-74. However, a year later Sweden and Denmark did
agree to an alliance of armed neutrality and invited the United States to join. BEMIS, DIP-
LOMATIC HISTORY, supra note 43, at 101. But this was after Jay had left for London, and
Washington declined to enter into a new alliance that had little support in Europe and that
could jeopardize peace with Britain. Id. The Swedish-Danish attempt to establish "free
ships make free goods" through a league of armed neutrality could not succeed because the
other members of the 1780 league had joined the coalition against France and adopted the
British position on neutral rights. See id. at 99.
367. The administration's refusal to protest the British violations of "free ships make
free goods" should be compared with its strong protests to Great Britain for declaring as
contraband corn and grain shipments to France. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas
Pinckney (May 7, 1793), in 25 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 674,
675-76; Cabinet Opinions on the Roland and Relations with Great Britain, France, and the
Creeks (Aug. 31, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 795,
444 [Vol. 46:373
EXECUTIVE POWER
tion felt very strongly, yet it did not assert such a position on neu-
tral rights, because it lacked authority under the law of nations.36 8
VII. AN ALTERNATIVE THEORY OF "EXECUTIVE POWER"
While members of the administration, Jefferson and Hamilton
each proposed a theory of executive power over foreign affairs that
was based on the Vesting Clause of Article I.' Jefferson present-
ed this theory to Washington in a private official opinion, and
796; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Pinckney (Sept. 7, 1793), in 27 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 55, 55. For the British argument that this prac-
tice was consistent with Vattel, at least in the context of the present war, see Letter from
Thomas Pinckney to Thomas Jefferson (July 5, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEF-
FERSON, supra note 10, at 439, 439-40; Letter from George Hammond to Thomas Jefferson
(Sept. 12, 1793), in 27 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 100, 100-01.
368. Lacking support in the law of nations, the administration would again yield on
"free ships makes free goods" in the 1794 Jay Treaty. See Treaty of Amity,
Commerce and Navigation, supra note 357, at art. XXV, 8 Stat. at 128. Jay had been in-
structed that this principle was desirable but not indispensable for the treaty-a practical
recognition that there was no possibility that the British would accept expanded protec-
tions of neutral rights during the war with France. See ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note
16, at 398, 410. The Jay Treaty was silent on neutral rights, stating only that those issues
would be discussed when the war with France ended. Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Nav-
igation, supra note 357, at art. XII, 8 Stat. at 122-23. This meant that the United States
acquiesced in the British practice of seizing (and paying for) French noncontraband goods
on neutral American ships. BEMIS, DIPLOMATIC HISTORY, supra note 43, at 103. However,
because the rule that "free ships make free goods" was in the 1778 treaty with France, this
provision in the Jay Treaty also meant that the United States allowed Britain more power
than France to seize the other's goods on American ships. This preference, combined with
the elimination of the preferential right of France to sell prizes brought into American
ports and other provisions of the Jay Treaty that were favorable to Britain, makes it easy
to understand why the French government regarded that treaty as moving the United
States from a condition of strict neutrality into one of "benevolent neutrality" in favor of
Great Britain and against France. The French Directory retaliated by suspending diplo-
matic relations with the United States and announcing that it would treat American ship-
ping exactly as did Britain-a repudiation of the 1778 treaty that became a prelude to the
Quasi-War. See id. at 107-08, 113-14. During the naval hostilities with France, the United
States omitted its long-standing advocacy of "free ships make free goods" in a new commer-
cial treaty with Prussia in 1799, which was a clear signal that the Adams administration
validated the British position in its (un-quasi) war with France. See id. at 118-19.
A postscript: "Free ships make free goods" was finally embedded into international law
by the European powers in the 1856 Declaration of Paris. See id. at 170. Ironically, the
United States, which had been the leading exponent of expanded neutral rights (albeit
with occasional lapses, as in the treaty with Prussia), refused to sign this convention-on
account of southern opposition to a provision that abolished privateering. While not ratified
by the United States, the Declaration of Paris was just in time to help preserve the Union:
the Confederacy was unable to mount a privateering campaign against the Union blockade
or commerce during the Civil War as foreign nations, adhering to the Declaration of Paris,
barred privateers from their ports. See id. at 368-69.
369. "The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of Ameri-
ca." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
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Hamilton presented it to the public in newspaper essays that were
published under a pseudonym.70
A. Jefferson and Diplomatic Appointments
In the spring of 1790, Washington followed with interest a
funding debate in the House of Representatives on whether the
President could be required to obtain the Senate's approval for the
grade and destination of each nominee for a diplomatic position."
He asked his new Secretary of State for a written opinion on the
extent of the Senate's advice and consent power over diplomatic
and consular nominees."
Jefferson's opinion asserted that the Article II Vesting Clause
gave the entire "executive Power" to the President, subject only to
limitations or restrictions stated elsewhere in the Constitution.7 1
Jefferson stated, "The transaction of business with foreign nations
is Executive altogether. It belongs then to the head of that de-
partment, except as to such portions of it as are specially submit-
ted to the Senate. Exceptions are to be construed strictly."374 Jef-
ferson then strictly construed the Appointments Clause and con-
cluded that the Senate could consider only the fitness of the nom-
inee but has no role in determining the nominee's grade or desti-
nation.37 5 According to Jefferson, for the Senate to reject a diplo-
matic nominee because it disagreed with the President's choice of
grade or destination would be an abuse of power.3 76 Washington
was pleased with this opinion and shared it with Madison and
Jay, who agreed with Jefferson. 7' Thus, "four of the most im-
370. For strong modern assertions of this theory, relying heavily on the actions of
Washington administration, see RAMSEY, supra note 1, at 76-88; Prakash & Ramsey, supra
note 1, at 295-355. The leading rebuttal is Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 1, at 636-87.
371. See POWELL, supra note 1, at 41-47.
372. See id. at 43-44.
373. See Jefferson's Opinion on the Powers of the Senate Respecting Diplomatic Ap-
pointments (Apr. 24, 1790), in 16 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 378, 378-80 (Julian
P. Boyd et al. eds., 1961). The Article II Vesting Clause theory had originally been ad-
vanced by Madison in the removal debate. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 516-21 (June 17, 1789)
(Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
374. Jefferson's Opinion on the Powers of the Senate Respecting Diplomatic Appoint-
ments (Apr. 24, 1790), in 16 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 373, at 378,
379.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. See POWELL, supra note 1, at 44.
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portant Founding-era constitutionalists . . . believed that the Con-
stitution entrusted significant foreign affairs powers exclusively to
the president, the substantive decisions about whether to send
diplomatic representatives to a given state and at what level.""'
Jefferson's attempt to place limitations on the Senate's advice
and consent power is certainly debatable."' But the largest diffi-
culty with relying on Jefferson's opinion as a constitutional doc-
trine is that neither Washington nor the Senate ever followed it.
Before the House funding debate, Washington had made two
diplomatic nominations, subject to the Senate's advice and con-
sent, both of which included grade and destination.8 o This practice
continued while the funding debate was in progress. On June 4,
1790, Washington nominated fourteen persons to be consuls or
vice-consuls to specified ports in eight countries or colonies; they
were confirmed by June 17th." One of those appointed was
Thomas Auldjo as Vice-Consul to the port of Cowes in Great Brit-
378. Id. at 47.
379. Jefferson's opinion is premised on executive dominance in foreign affairs. Under
this premise, the Senate should not second-guess the President on where American diplo-
mats should be stationed and what diplomatic grades they should hold. An alternative
premise is that foreign affairs powers are shared between the President and Congress. See
infra note 412. The appointment of diplomats may be seen as a prototypical example, with
presidential nominations requiring the approval of the Senate. Under a premise of shared
power, the issues of whether the United States has a permanent diplomatic representative
in a certain country and the diplomat's grade (which is a determinant of diplomatic im-
portance and compensation) are legitimate congressional interests over which the Senate
need not give total deference to the President.
In a draft of this article, I stated that a "serious weakness" in Jefferson's opinion was
that the advice and consent power of the Senate is written in unqualified terms; and, as
with all other plenary powers, the Constitution does not limit the reasons for which a ple-
nary power may be exercised. I was corrected by Professor Jefferson Powell, who pointed
out that the concept of abuse of a constitutional power was a widespread idea during the
founding era and in succeeding generations as well. For example, although the President's
power to veto legislation appears absolute, and that is how it is now generally regarded,
many in the founding and succeeding generations thought that the veto could be exercised
only to prevent the enactment of unconstitutional (as opposed to bad) laws. Indeed, this
principle became a central plank of Whig Party dogma following Andrew Jackson's per-
ceived abuses in vetoing legislation. Ironically, my instinctive application of modern doc-
trine is contrary to a central point of this article-that we should not project our own ideas
about law onto the founding generation. I am grateful to Professor Powell for bringing this
error to my attention.
380. In 1789, Washington nominated William Short and William Carmichael as charge
d'affaires to France and Spain, respectively; and both were confirmed for those positions. 1
JOURNAL OF THE EXECUTIVE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 6-7, 33-34 (1969 ed.) (1828) [hereinafter SENATE EXECUTIVE JOURNAL].
381. Id. at 47-52.
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ain. 8 When Auldjo arrived in Britain, the Ministry said that it
wanted him to serve in the nearby port of Poole." If Washington
believed that he had the exclusive power to determine the desti-
nations of diplomats and consuls, it would have been a simple
matter for him to issue a new commission. Instead, he renominat-
ed Auldjo to serve as Vice-Consul to Poole, and the Senate con-
firmed him for that position.14
In December 1791, a dispute over diplomatic appointments
arose in the Senate when Washington made three nominations:
Thomas Pinckney as Minister Plenipotentiary to Great Britain,
Gouverneur Morris as Minister Plenipotentiary to France, and
William Short as Minister Resident to the Netherlands.3 " The
Senate passed a resolution that it did "not possess evidence suffi-
cient to convince them that it will be for the interest of the U.S. to
appoint M[iniste]rs Plen[inpotentiary] to reside permanently at
Foreign Courts."8 Jefferson prepared a statement for Washington
to send to the Senate that repeated his constitutional opinion that
the President has the sole power to determine where diplomats
should serve and at what grade and that the Senate can advise
and consent only on their fitness."
Washington did not send this statement to the Senate; instead,
he asked Jefferson to meet with the Senate committee charged
with making recommendations on the nominations."' Jefferson
emphasized the need for the three appointments but also told the
committee that Congress could terminate them by refusing to
fund the positions in two years.' His attempts at persuasion
failed. A major Senate debate followed in which Washington's
supporters argued that his prestige and the public appearance of
382. Id. at 52.
383. Letter from Thomas Auldjo to Thomas Jefferson (Nov. 7, 1790), in 18 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 25, 25.
384. 1 SENATE EXECUTIVE JOURNAL, supra note 380, at 76.
385. Id. at 92.
386. Notes on Senate Debate (Jan. 3,1792), in 23 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON,
supra note 10, at 11, 14.
387. Letter from George Washington to the Senate (Jefferson draft) (Jan. 4, 1792), in 23
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 18, 18.
388. See Editor's Note to Letter from George Washington to the Senate (Jan. 4, 1792),
in 23 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 18, 18-19.
389. Memorandum on Meeting with Senate Committee (Jan. 4, 1792), in 23 THE PA-
PERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 19, 19-22.
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unity between the President and the Senate were at risk."'o The
Senate then approved Pinckney and Morris (the latter by a close
vote), but still no agreement existed on Short's appointment to the
Netherlands."' A motion that the Senate advise that no need was
present to appoint an envoy to the Netherlands resulted in a 13-
13 tie; Short was then approved 15-11.392
The precedential value of Jefferson's opinion is ultimately in-
conclusive. On the one hand, Washington apparently agreed with
it, as did Madison, a leader of the House of Representatives, and
Jay, a Secretary of Foreign Affairs under the Confederation and
then-current Chief Justice. Who was left out of this conversation?
The branch of government whose powers were at issue. There is
no evidence that the Senate was shown or considered Jefferson's
opinion. For political reasons, Washington may not have wanted
to provoke a dispute with the Senate over this matter; or he may
have become uncomfortable with the persuasiveness of Jefferson's
opinion. In either event, during Washington's entire presidency,
Jefferson's opinion was not tested. Washington never followed
that opinion in nominating diplomats and consuls-his nomina-
tions always included specified grades and destinations-and the
Senate never waived its right to reject a nominee for any reason.
Although a consensus in the government on the respective powers
of the President and Senate would have precedential force, no
such consensus was shown to exist on Jefferson's opinion.
B. The Pacificus Essays
With the newspapers full of attacks and defenses of Washing-
ton's neutrality policy, Alexander Hamilton decided to enter the
public opinion war with the publication of seven essays under the
pseudonym Pacificus. The purpose of these essays, he said, was to
demonstrate the President's authority to issue the Neutrality
Proclamation.3 " This purpose he accomplished with the observa-
tion that it was not necessary to vindicate executive authority on
any "broad and comprehensive ground" because "[t]hat clause of
the constitution which makes it his duty to take care that the
390. Editor's Note to Memorandum on Meeting with Senate Committee (Jan. 4, 1792),
in 23 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 19, 23.
391. Id. Pinckney was approved unanimously; the vote on Morris was 16-11. Id.
392. 1 SENATE EXECUTIVE JOURNAL, supra note 380, at 97-98.
393. Pacificus No. 1, supra note 264, at 33, 33-34.
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laws be faithfully executed might alone have been relied upon."394
At the beginning and end of his first essay, Hamilton defended the
Neutrality Proclamation as an exercise of the President's duty to
enforce the law of nations:
The President is the constitutional EXECUTOR of the laws. Our
Treaties and the laws of Nations form a part of the law of the land.
He who is to execute the laws must first judge for himself of their
meaning.... [I]t was necessary for the President to judge for himself
whether there was any thing in our treaties incompatible with an ad-
herence to neutrality. Having judged that there was not, he had a
right, and if in his opinion the interests of the Nation required it, it
was his duty, as Executor of the laws, to proclaim the neutrality of
the Nation, to exhort all persons to observe it, and to warn them of
the penalties which would attend its non observance.
The Proclamation has been represented as enacting some new law.
This is a view of it entirely erroneous. It only proclaims a fact with
regard to the existing state of the Nation, informs the citizens of what
the laws previously established require of them in that state, &
warns them that these laws will be put in execution against the In-
395fractors of them.
But this argument bracketed a more "broad and comprehen-
sive" one that Hamilton took from Jefferson's 1790 opinion on dip-
lomatic appointments-under the Article II Vesting Clause, the
Constitution gives the entire "executive Power" of the United
States to the President, except as qualified by powers given to
Congress or checks given to the Senate.396
Why was it necessary for Hamilton to assert the executive vest-
ing clause theory? It was certainly an opportunity for Hamilton to
publicly articulate a broad constitutional theory that would justify
his long-held view of expansive executive powers. But reading the
essays as a whole, and not just the first essay on constitutional
power, shows that Hamilton had another agenda that was tai-
lored to the immediate political controversy. The Pacificus essays
did not defend the Neutrality Proclamation as it was intended by
Washington-they interpreted the Proclamation as having the
effect on the French treaties that Hamilton had argued unsuccess-
fully in the Cabinet. Large portions of those arguments are repro-
394. Id. at 42-43.
395. Id. at 43; see also id. at 33-36. Madison had also relied on the Take Care Clause as
a secondary argument in the removal debate. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 373, at
516.
396. Pacificus No. 1, supra note 264, at 33, 38-42.
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duced in the Pacificus essays: the alliance with France is defen-
sive, but France has been the aggressor in the European wars;
the execution of the guarantee of the French West Indies is dan-
gerous;9 8 gratitude to France is not a basis for adhering to the al-
liance;.." France was acting in its own self-interest in entering into
the treaties;400 and fundamental changes have taken place in the
French government-all bad-since the treaties were signed.401
These arguments made the alliance with France politically disa-
greeable and potentially dangerous, but an argument was still
needed to establish that it could be invalidated. Hamilton proba-
bly realized, from Jefferson's and Randolph's rebuttals, that rely-
ing on the disputed passage from Vattel was not tenable; instead,
he advanced an expansive theory of executive power.
Thus, Hamilton used the executive vesting clause theory to
demonstrate that the President has the unilateral power to nullify
or suspend treaties, because it is a foreign policy decision that was
not given to Congress or made subject to a check by the Senate. As
confirmation of this power, Hamilton reclaimed the seemingly in-
nocuous clause in Section 3 of Article II that the President "shall
receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers."402 When writing
as Publius in 1788, Hamilton had dismissed this clause as placing
a ministerial duty on the President which "is more a matter of
dignity than of authority" and "will be without consequence in the
administration of the government."403 Writing as Pacificus five
years later, Hamilton asserted that this clause gave the President
the power to recognize or to not recognize foreign governments
and, in the latter situation, to declare preexisting treaties sus-
pended.404 Moreover, as Pacificus, he asserted that the President
had in fact declared void the guarantee in the Treaty of Alliance,
because the Proclamation "is virtually a manifestation of the
397. Pacificus No. 2, supra 287, at 55, 55-63.
398. Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus No. 3 (July 6, 1793), reprinted in 15 THE PAPERS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 67, at 65, 65-69.
399. Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus No. 4 (July 10, 1793), reprinted in 15 THE PAPERS
OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 67, at 82, 82-86.
400. Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus No. 5 (July 13-17, 1793), reprinted in 15 THE PA-
PERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 67, at 90, 90-95.
401. Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus No. 6 (July 17, 1793), reprinted in 15 THE PAPERS
OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 67, at 100, 100-06; Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus
No. 7 (July 21, 1793), id. at 130, 130-35.
402. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
403. THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, supra note 162, at 419 (Alexander Hamilton).
404. Pacificus No. 1, supra note 264, at 33, 41.
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sense of the Government that the U[nited] States are, under the
circumstances of the case, not bound to exercise the clause of
Guarantee."405
It is important to appreciate that Hamilton's Pacificus essays
were neither private opinions to the President nor public declara-
tions by the administration. Instead, they were essays signed un-
der a pseudonym in which Hamilton attempted to convince the
public of a position that had failed to convince the President.'
Washington evidently was not pleased, telling Jefferson that he
was "certainly uneasy about those [doctrines] grasped at by
Pacificus.""' The question I wish to examine, however, is whether
Hamilton's executive vesting theory explains or provides support
for the actions of the Washington administration during the Neu-
trality Crisis.
The executive vesting theory posits that the President has a
general power to determine the content of foreign affairs that is
limited only by the specific powers granted to Congress and the
checks given to the Senate. If the power to declare war is con-
strued narrowly in limiting the Executive's power over foreign af-
fairs, the executive vesting theory can support Washington's dec-
laration that the country was at peace with the belligerents. How-
ever, Washington did much more. He declared strict neutrality,
and he prohibited France from fitting out privateers in U.S. ports,
seizing prizes within American territorial limits, and establishing
consular courts to condemn prizes. Yet all of these decisions ap-
pear to be within a constitutional "exception" to executive power,
namely the enumerated power in Congress "[t]o define and punish
Piracies and Felonies committed on the high seas, and Offences
against the Law of Nations."408 No matter how narrowly one might
try to construe this clause, it appears impossible to render it in-
405. Id. at 36; see also Pacificus No. 2, supra note 287, at 55, 56.
406. See, e.g., STUART LIEBIGER, FOUNDING FRIENDSHIP: GEORGE WASHINGTON, JAMES
MADISON, AND THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 175 (1999); Golove &
Hulsebosch, supra note 1, at 1020-21 & n.348 (explaining the debate over Pacificus-
Helvidius).
407. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 3, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 606, 606. Hamilton himself may have had second
thoughts. He responded to one critical letter-writer that Pacificus was being misunder-
stood-the treaties with France could have been voided or suspended but the Executive
had decided that they were still in effect, which Pacificus necessarily accepted. Letter from
Alexander Hamilton (as Pacificus) to Mr. Dunlap (Aug. 5, 1793), in 15 THE PAPERS OF AL.
EXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 67, at 191-93.
408. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
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applicable to declarations of American neutrality,40 including such
enforcement provisions as prohibiting privateers from operating
in U.S. ports and American citizens from committing acts of hos-
tility against nations with which the United States is at peace-
conduct that was made criminal in the Neutrality Act. These ac-
tions of the administration can be supported by the duty to en-
force the law of nations as part of the law of the land, but they
cannot be supported by the executive vesting theory.
Some scholars have interpreted Hamilton's theory more nar-
rowly, believing it presupposes concurrent powers between the
executive and legislative branches over foreign affairs, with the
ultimate determinations in Congress.4 10 This more limited inter-
pretation of Hamilton's theory largely explains the positive ac-
tions taken by the Washington administration during the Neu-
trality Crisis and provides a framework for the Executive's initia-
tive in foreign policy that continued to the modern era.411 Never-
theless, this theory of executive power cannot fully explain the
actions of the Washington administration, because it fails to ac-
count for decisions. that the administration desired to make, but
did not make, out of a perceived absence of authority. The admin-
istration refused both to prohibit the sales of French prizes in the
United States (even though the treaties with France prohibited
sales of British prizes) and to assert the historic American princi-
ple that "free ships make free goods." Applying the concurrent ex-
ecutive vesting theory, why could not the President have prohibit-
ed the sales of French prizes and asserted diplomatically, as the
policy of the United States, that free ships make free goods? These
actions are ones that the President wanted to take, and as discre-
tionary exercises of executive power in foreign affairs, could have
taken. But the administration decided it did not have the power to
adopt these policies because they were not within the scope of
neutral obligations and rights as recognized in the law of nations.
Washington's decisions during the Neutrality Crisis cannot be ex-
plained by Hamilton's attempt to expand the discretionary scope
of executive power.
409. In fact, all future declarations of American neutrality were made by Congress.
Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 85 (1972).
410. See, e.g., CASTO, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 1, at 62-65; EDWARD S. CORwIN,
THE PRESIDENT'S CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 7-32 (1917).
411. ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER 127-29
(1976).
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This conclusion does not mean that the executive vesting theory
is incorrect; indeed, a theory of concurrent powers has particular
appeal.412 However, its support must come elsewhere than from a
study of the Washington administration.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper draws three principal conclusions about executive
power and the law of nations in the Washington administration.
First, the most plausible actual source of the Washington admin-
istration's constitutional authority to determine the content of
foreign policy during the Neutrality Crisis was the duty of the Ex-
ecutive, under the Take Care Clause, to obey the law of nations as
expounded by the continental publicists. This source of authority
was: (1) repeatedly asserted in the administration's declarations,
(2) the basis of its private deliberations, (3) consistent with the
jurisprudence of the founding generation, and (4) explanatory of
412. Such a theory can be derived independently of the executive vesting clause from
the structure of the Constitution. At the time of the founding, the nation's foreign relations
included four central elements: (1) the conduct of diplomacy through accredited ambassa-
dors and foreign ministers, (2) the making of treaties, (3) the regulation of foreign com-
merce, and (4) the declaration of war. The initiative in foreign policy (and hopefully its
successful conclusion) was conducted through the first two of these powers, while the latter
two werecoercive actions that were taken when ordinary diplomacy failed (at the time of
the founding, the power to regulate foreign commerce was a means of applying economic
pressure against unfriendly nations).
The way that these powers are shared in the Constitution between the President and
Congress strongly suggests an initiating power in the Executive. The President has plena-
ry powers to nominate ambassadors and foreign ministers and to "make" treaties, subject
to the approval of the Senate. The executive powers to appoint diplomatic representatives
and to make treaties necessarily imply authority to formulate and initiate the nation's
foreign affairs. Without such an implied power, the enumerated powers in the Executive
would be meaningless formalities-appointed ambassadors cannot conduct diplomacy and
treaties cannot be negotiated in the absence of a pre-determined foreign policy. But under
such a concurrent distribution of power, the ultimate determinations remain with Con-
gress, which has plenary powers over foreign commerce and war, can block diplomatic ap-
pointments and treaties and has the residual power to make laws that it deems necessary
to execute all powers of the government.
This theory of concurrent powers is also consistent with (and explanative of) prevailing
doctrine-Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in the Steel Seizure Case. Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (describ-
ing the extent of presidential authority as dependent on the degree of Congressional ap-
proval or disapproval). This framework has been adopted by the Supreme Court in Medel-
lin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 524-25 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 593 n.23
(2006); id. at 638-39 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part); and Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453
U.S. 654, 668-69 (1981). I have elaborated on this theory, using as the fulcrums the
McCulloch doctrine of implied powers and the Framers' definitive responses to experiences
within England and between the colonies and England. Robert J. Reinstein, The Limits of
Executive Power, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 259, 260-65 (2009).
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the actions that were taken (and not taken) by the administration.
No other theory of executive power appears to satisfy these crite-
ria.
Second, Washington established an important precedent that
the Executive is duty-bound to obey the obligations of interna-
tional law that are incorporated into national law. To be sure, cus-
tomary international law based on legal positivism is not simply
an updated version of the eighteenth-century law of nations. The
gulf between the mandatory law of nations, based on natural law
as expounded by the continental publicists, and customary inter-
national law, based on legal positivism's requirement of express
consent or implied consent through practice, is so great as to af-
fect their respective incorporations into domestic law. When the
law of nations and national law were both based on natural law,
incorporation was practically automatic. But when customary in-
ternational law was based on legal positivism, the scope of incor-
poration became more modest and limiting than during the found-
ing era.
We may be in another transitional phase in the jurisprudence of
international law."' Although states themselves continue to sup-
port positivism, "soft law" has been making inroads; and on issues
such as human rights and transitional justice, we may be return-
ing full circle to principles based substantially on natural law. But
whatever the future jurisprudence of international law may be,"'
a threshold question will be the extent to which it is incorporated
into national law. To the extent that international law remains
part of the law of the United States, the Washington administra-
tion set an important precedent that the Executive is duty-bound
to obey it.
Third, apart from the precedential duty of the Executive to obey
international law, the fact that the founding generation thought
413. On the different contemporary approaches to international law, see 36 STUDIES IN
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL POLICY, THE METHODS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Steven R. Ratner
& Anne-Marie Slaughter eds., 2004).
414. Vattel may be making a comeback as international law scholars appear to have
renewed interest in his work and its relevance to contemporary issues. For a major set of
essays exploring these matters, see VATrEL'S INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A XXIST CENTURY
PERSPECTIVE (Vincent Chetail & Peter Haggenmacher eds., 2011). See also Anthony J.
Bellia, Jr., & Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort Statute and the Law of Nations, 78 U. CHI.
L. REV. 445, 471-77 (2011) (relying heavily on Vattel and his influence on the founders for
an original interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute).
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so differently about law should give pause to those who view the
actions of the Washington administration as establishing an orig-
inal understanding that can be the basis of modern general theo-
ries of the scope of executive power over foreign affairs. Washing-
ton set an eternal example in his commitment to the rule of law.
Throughout the Neutrality Crisis, he took dramatic actions, but
only after being convinced that those actions had firm constitu-
tional support. That support came from a jurisprudence of the law
of nations that was a product of his time. On some specific issues,
such as the duty of the Executive to obey the constraints of inter-
national law, differences in jurisprudence may not ultimately be
determinative. These differences are dispositive, however, for
general theories on the scope of executive power over foreign af-
fairs. The decisions of the Washington administration that mod-
ern scholars view as demonstrating broad presidential discretion
in foreign affairs appear instead to have been based on the Presi-
dent's responsibility to enforce the law of nations. This determina-
tion supports the principle that the President cannot unilaterally
violate international law but otherwise has little relevance to the
general scope of modern presidential power to determine and con-
duct the nation's foreign affairs.
Ultimately, this article illustrates the limits of originalism in
determining the scope of executive power over foreign affairs. The
profound changes that have occurred in the United States since
the founding are not merely related to such matters as population,
demography, culture, geography, technology, and national power.
Another profound change is that the founders' way of thinking
about law can be incompatible with our own. A general theory of
presidential power over foreign affairs cannot be derived from ac-
tions of the Washington administration that were founded on and
justified by doctrines expounded by continental publicists in trea-
tises of natural law. The founders made history, but they did not
end it.
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